Tag: Bank of Japan



The yen has been depreciating against the dollar and other currencies for several months. It fell from 100 yen = $0.97 in January 2021 to $0.61 by the end of July 2026 – a fall of 37%. This marked a 40-year low. But then, at the end of July it rallied and by 3 August the rate was 100 yen = $0.64 – a rise of nearly 5%. But why did this happen and what will be the implications for Japan and the wider world economy?

Why has the yen fallen so much since 2021?

There have been two main drivers.

The first is fiscal policy. For many years, Japan has been pursuing expansionary fiscal policy in an attempt to stimulate the sluggish economy. This has led to large budget deficits and public-sector debt. Since 2020, general government gross debt has been around 255% of GDP, the largest of any high-income economy.

Recently, the Japanese government has adopted aggressive supplementary budgets to fund, among other things, fuel subsidies and public-private investment initiatives. This has involved the issuance of more government bonds to fund the necessary borrowing.

Fiscal pressures have also increased becase of demography. A rapidly aging population and declining birth rates have required substantial public spending on healthcare, social security and pensions. Meanwhile, the tax-paying working-age population has declined as a proportion of total population.

On the plus side, unlike most highly indebted nations, over 90% of Japan’s debt is held domestically by Japanese residents, Japanese institutional investors, banks and the Bank of Japan (BoJ). This lowers the risk of default and hence the risk premium on Japanese bonds.

The second driver is monetary policy. Interest rates have been kept low over many years, including periods of negative rates, as the BoJ has attempted to stimulate the economy. Low interest rates have sometimes been backed up with quantitative easing to increase money supply.

Since March 2024, however, there have been four interest rate increases. The latest was in June 2026 when the BoJ raised the short-term policy rate from 0.75% to 1.0% – the highest level since 1995. Despite this, interest rates have remained below those in other countries, and this contributed to the continuing fall of the yen.

A falling yen has helped to increase Japanese exports by making them more competitive, but more expensive imports have contributed to rising Japanese inflation.

Low interest rates have also stimulated the yen-dollar carry trade. This is where investors borrow money in yen at low interest rates, convert it into US dollars and invest it in higher-yielding US assets, typically US government bonds (‘Treasury bonds’). This borrowing in yen to buy dollars further contributed to the depreciation of the yen against the dollar.

Co-ordinated intervention

In an attempt to raise the value of the yen, the Bank of Japan and the US Federal Reserve acted together – their first joint currency rescue operation since 2011. The BoJ spent tens of billions of dollars to buy yen; the US Treasury bought yen by selling euros. Prior to the intervention, global hedge funds held near-record short positions against the yen, meaning that they sold yen at a current price, agreeing to buy them back at a particular later date, hoping that the yen would fall in the meantime and that they would therefore make a profit. The sudden joint intervention forced these traders to buy back the yen to cut their losses before the rate rose further. This accelerated the yen’s appreciation.

But why did the USA join Japan in intervening? Japan is the largest foreign holder of US Treasuries ($1.1 trillion). The USA intervened to discourage Japanese investors from selling US Treasuries in order to raise cash, thereby pushing up US borrowing costs.

The rise in the yen was also encouraged by speculators who are expecting further interest rate rises from the BoJ to counter inflation and support public finances, driving domestic bond yields higher. This will lead to a narrowing of interest rates between Japan and other countries.

Effects on the Japanese economy

If the yen continues to appreciate, this will help to reduce inflation by making imports cheaper and will help to ease cost-of-living pressures on Japanese consumers. Japan is heavily reliant on imported energy and raw materials.

However, the decline in the yen over recent years has provided a large boost to Japanese exports. A sharp reversal in this could severely affect exporters’ profits and have a serious negative impact on economic growth.

If the appreciation continues, it would lead to an unwinding of the carry trade. To prevent mounting currency losses, highly leveraged institutional investors would be forced to sell assets, such as US and other countries’ shares and bonds to buy back yen and pay off their debts. This potentially massive unwinding would be likely to create global market volatility and drive up interest rates.

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Questions

  1. What have been the benefits and costs to Japan of a depreciating exchange rate?
  2. Explain the carry trade.
  3. Why might the yen-dollar carry trade unwind and what would be the consequences for Japan and the USA?
  4. Find out what has happened to the exchange rate between the yen and the euro. Has this been driven by the carry trade?
  5. For what reasons might the yen (a) now continue rising; (b) resume depreciating?
  6. Find out what has happened to the yen/dollar exchange rate since this blog was written. Explain your findings.

We have examined inflation in several blogs in recent months. With inflation at levels not seen for 40 years, this is hardly surprising. One question we’ve examined is whether the policy response has been correct. For example, in July, we asked whether the Bank of England had raised interest rates too much, too late. In judging policy, one useful distinction is between demand-pull inflation and cost-push inflation. Do they require the same policy response? Is raising interest rates to get inflation down to the target rate equally applicable to inflation caused by excessive demand and inflation caused by rising costs, where those rising costs are not caused by rising demand?

In terms of aggregate demand and supply, demand-pull inflation is shown by continuing rightward shifts in aggregate demand (AD); cost-push inflation is shown by continuing leftward/upward shifts in short-run aggregate supply (SRAS). This is illustrated in the following diagram, which shows a single shift in aggregate demand or short-run aggregate supply. For inflation to continue, rather than being a single rise in prices, the curves must continue to shift.

As you can see, the effects on real GDP (Y) are quite different. A rise in aggregate demand will tend to increase GDP (as long as capacity constraints allow). A rise in costs, and hence an upward shift in short-run aggregate supply, will lead to a fall in GDP as firms cut output in the face of rising costs and as consumers consume less as the cost of living rises.

The inflation experienced by the UK and other countries in recent months has been largely of the cost-push variety. Causes include: supply-chain bottlenecks as economies opened up after COVID-19; the war in Ukraine and its effects on oil and gas supplies and various grains; and avian flu and poor harvests from droughts and floods associated with global warming resulting in a fall in food supplies. These all led to a rise in prices. In the UK’s case, this was compounded by Brexit, which added to firms’ administrative costs and, according to the Bank of England, was estimated to cause a long-term fall in productivity of around 3 to 4 per cent.

The rise in costs had the effect of shifting short-run aggregate supply upwards to the left. As well as leading to a rise in prices and a cost-of-living squeeze, the rising costs dampened expenditure.

This was compounded by a tightening of fiscal policy as governments attempted to tackle public-sector deficits and debt, which had soared with the support measures during the pandemic. It was also compounded by rising interest rates as central banks attempted to bring inflation back to target.

Monetary policy response

Central banks are generally charged with keeping inflation in the medium term at a target rate set by the government or the central bank itself. For most developed countries, this is 2% (see table in the blog, Should central bank targets be changed?). So is raising interest rates the correct policy response to cost-push inflation?

One argument is that monetary policy is inappropriate in the face of supply shocks. The supply shocks themselves have the effect of dampening demand. Raising interest rates will compound this effect, resulting in lower growth or even a recession. If the supply shocks are temporary, such as supply-chain disruptions caused by lockdowns during the pandemic, then it might be better to ride out the problem and not raise interest rates or raise them by only a small amount. Already cost pressures are easing in some areas as supplies have risen.

If, however, the fall in aggregate supply is more persistent, such as from climate-related declines in harvests or the Ukraine war dragging on, or new disruptions to supply associated with the Israel–Gaza war, or, in the UK’s case, with Brexit, then real aggregate demand may need to be reduced in order to match the lower aggregate supply. Or, at the very least, the growth in aggregate demand may need to be slowed to match the slower growth in aggregate supply.

Huw Pill, the Chief Economist at the Bank of England, in a podcast from the Columbia Law School (see links below), argued that people should recognise that the rise in costs has made them poorer. If they respond to the rising costs by seeking higher wages, or in the case of businesses, by putting up prices, this will simply stoke inflation. In these circumstances, raising interest rates to cool aggregate demand may reduce people’s ability to gain higher wages or put up prices.

Another argument for raising interest rates in the face of cost-push inflation is when those cost increases are felt more than in other countries. The USA has suffered less from cost pressures than the UK. On the other hand, its growth rate is higher, suggesting that its inflation, albeit lower than in the UK, is more of the demand-pull variety. Despite its inflation rate being lower than in the UK, the problem of excess demand has led the Fed to adopt an aggressive interest rate policy. Its target rate is 5.25% to 5.50%, while the Bank of England’s is 5.25%. In order to prevent short-term capital outflows and a resulting depreciation in the pound, further stoking inflation, the Bank of England has been under pressure to mirror interest rate rises in the USA, the eurozone and elsewhere.

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Questions

  1. How may monetary policy affect inflationary expectations?
  2. If cost-push inflation makes people generally poorer, what role does the government have in making the distribution of a cut in real income a fair one?
  3. In the context of cost-push inflation, how might the authorities prevent a wage–price spiral?
  4. With reference to the second article above, explain the ‘monetary policy conundrum’ faced by the Bank of Japan.
  5. If central banks have a single policy instrument, namely changes in interest rates, how may conflicts arise when there is more than one macroeconomic objective?
  6. Is Russia’s rise in inflation the result of cost or demand pressures, or a mixture of the two (see articles above)?

Following the recession of 2008/9, the UK has engaged in four rounds of quantitative easing (QE) – the process whereby the central bank increases the money supply by purchasing government bonds, and possibly other assets, on the open market from various institutions. The final round was announced in July 2012, bringing the total assets purchased to £375bn. As yet, however, there are no plans for quantitative tightening – the process of the Bank of England selling some of these assets, thereby reducing money supply.

The aim of QE has been to stimulate aggregate demand. Critics claim, however, that the effect on spending has been limited, since the money has not gone directly to consumers but rather to the institutions selling the assets, who have used much of the money to buy shares, bonds and other assets. Nevertheless, with banks having to strengthen their capital base following the financial crisis, QE has helped then to achieve this without having to make even bigger reductions in lending.

The Bank of England now reckons that the recovery is sufficiently established and there is, therefore, no need for further QE.

This is also the judgement of the Federal Reserve about the US economy, which experienced annual growth of 3.5% in the third quarter of 2014. The IMF predicts that US growth will be around 3% for the next three years.

The Fed has had three rounds of QE since the financial crisis, but in October 2014 called an end to the process. Since the start of this year, it has been gradually reducing the amount it injects each month from $85bn to $15bn. The total bond purchases over the past five years have been some $3.6tn, bringing the Fed’s balance sheet to nearly $4.5tn.

But as QE comes to an end in the USA, Japan is expanding its programme. On 31 October, the Bank of Japan announced that it would increase its asset purchases from ¥60-70tn per year to ¥80tn (£440bn). The Japanese government and central bank are determined to boost economic growth in Japan and escape the two decades of deflation and stagnation. The Tokyo stock market rose by some 8% in the week following the announcement and the yen fell by more than 5% against the dollar.

And the European Central Bank, which has not used full QE up to now, looks as if it is moving in that direction. In October, it began a programme of buying asset-backed securities (ABSs) and covered bonds (CBs). These are both private-sector securities: ABSs are claims against non-financial companies in the eurozone and CBs are issued by eurozone banks and other financial institutions.

It now looks as if the ECB might take the final step of purchasing government bonds. This is probably what is implied by ECB President Mario Draghi’s statement after the 6 November meeting of the ECB that the ground was being prepared for “further measures to be implemented, if needed”.

But has QE been as successful as its proponents would claim? Is it the solution now to a languishing eurozone economy? The following articles look at these questions.

Fed calls time on QE in the US – charts and analysis The Guardian, Angela Monaghan (29/10/14)
Quantitative easing: giving cash to the public would have been more effective The Guardian, Larry Elliott (29/10/14)
End of QE is whimper not bang BBC News, Robert Peston (29/10/14)
Federal Reserve ends QE The Telegraph, Katherine Rushton (29/10/14)
Bank of Japan to inject 80 trillion yen into its economy The Guardian, Angela Monaghan and Graeme Wearden (31/10/14)
Every man for himself The Economist, Buttonwood column (8/11/14)
Why Japan Surprised the World with its Quantitative Easing Announcement Townhall, Nicholas Vardy (7/11/14)
Bank of Japan QE “Treat” Is a Massive Global Trick Money Morning, Shah Gilani (31/10/14)
ECB stimulus may lack desired scale, QE an option – sources Reuters, Paul Carrel and John O’Donnell (27/10/14)
ECB door remains open to quantitative easing despite doubts over impact Reuters, Eva Taylor and Paul Taylor (9/11/14)
ECB could pump €1tn into eurozone in fresh round of quantitative easing The Guardian,
Angela Monaghan and Phillip Inman (6/11/14)
Ben Bernanke: Quantitative easing will be difficult for the ECB CNBC, Jeff Cox (5/11/14)
Not All QE Is Created Equal as U.S. Outpunches ECB-BOJ Bloomberg, Simon Kennedy (6/11/14)
A QE proposal for Europe’s crisis The Economist, Yanis Varoufakis (7/11/14)
UK, Japan and 1% inflation BBC News, Linda Yueh (12/11/14)
Greenspan Sees Turmoil Ahead As QE Market Boost Unwinds Bloomberg TV, Gillian Tett interviews Alan Greenspan (29/10/14)

Questions

  1. What is the transmission mechanism between central bank purchases of assets and aggregate demand?
  2. Under what circumstances might the effect of a given amount of QE on aggregate demand be relatively small?
  3. What dangers are associated with QE?
  4. What determines the likely effect on inflation of QE?
  5. What has been the effect of QE in developed countries on the economies of developing countries? Has this been desirable for the global economy?
  6. Have businesses benefited from QE? If so, how? If not, why not?
  7. What has been the effect of QE on the housing market (a) in the USA; (b) in the UK?
  8. Why has QE not been ‘proper’ money creation?
  9. What effect has QE had on credit creation? How and why has it differed between the USA and UK?
  10. Why did the announcement of further QE by the Bank of Japan lead to a depreciation of the yen? What effect is this depreciation likely to have?

With many countries struggling to recover from the depression of the past few years, central banks are considering more and more doveish moves to kick-start lending. But with short-term interest rates in the USA, the UK and Japan close to zero, the scope for further cuts are limited. So what can central banks do?

The first thing that can be done is to adopt a higher inflation target or to accept inflation above target – at least for the time being. This could be accompanied by explicitly targeting GDP growth (real or nominal) or unemployment (see the blog from last December, Rethinking central bank targets).

The second option is to increase quantitative easing. Although in a minority at the last MPC meeting, Mervyn King, the current Bank of England Governor, argued for a further £25 billion of asset purchases (bringing the total to £400bn) (see MPC minutes paragraph 39). It is highly likely that the MPC will agree to further QE at its next meeting in March. In Japan, the new governor of the Bank of Japan is expected to include asset purchases as part of the policy of monetary easing.

The third option is for the central bank to provide finance at below-market rates of interest directly to the banking sector specifically for lending: e.g. to small businesses or for house purchase. The Bank of England’s Funding for Lending Scheme is an example and the Bank is considering extending it to other financial institutions.

One other approach, mooted by the Bank of England’s Deputy Governor before the House of Commons Treasury Select Committee, is for negative interest rates paid on Banks’ reserves in the Bank of England. This would, in effect, be a fee levied on banks for keeping money on deposit. The idea would be to encourage banks to lend the money and not to keep excessive liquidity. As you can see from the chart, three rounds of quantitative easing have led to a huge increase in bank’s reserves at the Bank of England. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart.)

The following articles consider these various proposals and whether they will work to stimulate lending and thereby aggregate demand and economic recovery.

Central banks: Brave new words The Economist (23/2/13)
Phoney currency wars The Economist (16/2/13)
Analysis: Global central banks will keep taking it easy Reuters, Alan Wheatley (22/2/13)
Quantitative easing: the markets are struggling with a serious drug habi The Guardian, Larry Elliott (24/2/13)
Negative interest rates idea floated by Bank’s Paul Tucker BBC News (26/2/13)
Bank of England mulls negative interest rates Independent, Ben Chu (26/2/13)
BoE floats extending Funding for Lending to non-banks Mortgage Solutions, Adam Williams (26/2/13)
Funding for Lending Scheme failing to get banks lending Left Foot Forward, James Bloodworth (26/2/13)
Mortgage market boosted by lending schemes, says Redrow BBC News (26/2/13)
Widespread quantitative easing risks ‘QE wars’ and stagnation The Guardian, Nouriel Roubini (28/2/13)

Questions

  1. Consider each of the methods outlined above and their chances of success in stimulating aggregate demand.
  2. Go through each of the methods and consider the problems they are likely to create/have created.
  3. How important is it that monetary policy measures affect people’s expectations?
  4. What effects do the measures have on the distribution of income between borrowers and savers?
  5. What are annuities? How are these affected by policies of monetary easing?
  6. How has actual and anticipated Japanese monetary policy affected the exchange rate of the Japanese yen? How is this likely to affect the Japanese economy?
  7. Explain the sub-heading of the final article above, “When several major central banks pursue QE at the same time, it becomes a zero-sum game”. Do you agree?