
The grocery retail market in New Zealand is worth billions of dollars each year and is one of the most concentrated supermarket sectors in the world. The industry is dominated by two large groups: Foodstuffs and Woolworths New Zealand. Together, these firms account for around 80–90 per cent of grocery sales, with Foodstuffs operating brands such as Pak’nSave, New World and Four Square, while Woolworths operates the Woolworths supermarket chain.
The market displays many of the characteristics of an oligopoly. The two dominant firms compete through store location, loyalty schemes, advertising and product range, and to some extent through pricing. At the same time, they benefit from substantial economies of scale, extensive distribution networks and strong relationships with suppliers. These factors mean that there are significant barriers to entry in the market and this can prevent new firms from entering the market and surviving.
Competition concerns
Concern about competition in the sector has led to investigations by New Zealand’s Commerce Commission. The Commission concluded that although there was competition in the market, it was less than optimal and both firms were earning higher profits than they would have been able to earn had they been in operating in a more competitive market.
It identified various barriers to entry that limited competition, including access to suitable retail sites, ownership of distribution networks and the difficulty of establishing large-scale supply chains in a country with a relatively small population.
Despite the market being dominated by these two big firms, there are also many smaller retailers operating within the market, including independent grocery stores, convenience stores and specialist food retailers. However, they lack the scale that is needed to challenge the dominance of Foodstuffs and Woolworths at a national level.
Potential international entrants, such as Aldi and Lidl, have often been suggested as possible competitors, but the costs of establishing a nationwide network of stores and distribution facilities in New Zealand are significant. There have been examples of large and dominant supermarkets in one country attempting to enter the market in other countries but failing to survive or deciding to exit the market early. For example, Tesco entered the Chinese market in 2004 but, despite its efforts, exited the market in 2020.
Response by the New Zealand government
In response to concerns about competition, the New Zealand government has introduced a series of measures designed to make market entry easier. These include restrictions on anti-competitive land covenants, the introduction of a Grocery Commissioner and changes intended to improve access to wholesale grocery supply.
But, despite these measures, recent reports suggest that the overall market structure has changed little, with the two major firms continuing to dominate grocery retailing.
The public interest
Supporters of the current market structure argue that large supermarket chains deliver lower costs through economies of scale and provide consumers with extensive product choice.
Critics counter that limited competition leads to higher prices, reduced innovation and weaker bargaining power for suppliers.
The debate illustrates the difficulties faced by policymakers when attempting to balance efficiency against the promotion of competition.
Whether greater competition will emerge in the future remains uncertain. Much will depend on whether existing reforms can encourage new entrants or whether the structural advantages enjoyed by Foodstuffs and Woolworths continue to deter potential rivals.
Articles
- ‘Substantive, potentially systemic’ supermarket concerns raised by Commerce Commission
RNZ News, Susan Edmunds (7/7/26)
- Supermarkets aren’t the problem. This issue is a far bigger deal
Money Stuff, Rupert Carlyon (23/9/26)
- This may be as good as it gets: NZ and Australia face a complicated puzzle when it comes to supermarket prices
The Conversation, Richard Meade (23/4/25)
- Every party has pitched its own supermarket fix. What if we combined the best ideas?
The Conversation, Jonathan Baker (21/9/26)
- NZ regulator eyes ‘problematic’ supermarket supplier fees
Inside FMCG, Sean Cao (7/7/26)
- Australia vs NZ: Supermarket competition compared
Consumer NZ, Vanessa Pratley (27/3/25)
- Grocery Commissioner puts supermarkets on notice
RNZ News, Susan Edmunds (18/3/26)
- High margins, double the normal returns – does NZ’s supermarket duopoly drive prices up?
The Press, Susan Edmunds (22/9/26)
- Everyone wants to break up the supermarkets. How would it actually work?
The Spinoff, Joel MacManus (22/9/26)
Questions
- What are the characteristics of the New Zealand supermarket industry that create barriers to entry for new firms?
- To what extent is the New Zealand grocery market consistent with the characteristics of an oligopoly?
- Evaluate the likely effectiveness of government measures designed to increase competition in the supermarket sector.
- Australia too has two main supermarket chains: Coles and Woolworths. However, Aldi has entered the Australian market and in some parts of the country had provided significant competition to the two major chians. Why may Aldi have more difficulty in entering the New Zealnd market
- Investigate the grocery retail market in another country (not the UK). Who are the major competitors and what is their market share? What barriers to entry exist? Has the competition authority expressed concerns about the market and if so, what are they?

Artificial intelligence (AI) has become a key technology in the 21st Century. Businesses use AI systems to analyse data, automate routine tasks, improve customer service, write software, create content and even assist with decision-making. As AI improves and becomes even more capable, governments, economists, businesses and society are debating its effects on productivity, employment and economic growth – and also its potentially extreme dangers.
Some commentators compare AI to earlier technological revolutions such as the steam engine, electricity and the Internet. They argue that AI will continue to increase productivity, create new industries and improve living standards. Others worry that AI may eliminate a large numbers of jobs, increase inequality, concentrate economic power in a few firms and, in the most extreme scenarios, pose a threat to humanity itself.
These debates raise important questions including how society should evaluate the potential risks of a technology whose benefits may be enormous but whose long-term consequences remain uncertain.
AI and the labour market
Historically, technological change has had both positive and negative effects on employment. Automation reduced the demand for many agricultural workers, while creating jobs in manufacturing. Computers automated clerical tasks but generated entirely new industries in software, telecommunications and digital services.
AI appears likely to follow a similar pattern. According to the World Economic Forum, advances in AI, robotics and information-processing technologies are expected to transform labour markets significantly during the second half of the 2020s, creating demand for new skills while reducing demand for others. The fastest-growing skills are expected to include AI and big data, technological literacy and cybersecurity.
The potential benefits
AI may benefit labour markets in several ways:
- Higher productivity: Workers can complete tasks more quickly with AI assistance.
- New occupations: Demand has emerged for AI engineers, prompt specialists, data scientists and AI governance professionals.
- Better decision-making: Firms can use AI to improve forecasting, inventory management and customer service.
- Complementing human skills: AI may perform repetitive tasks, allowing employees to focus on creativity, problem-solving and interpersonal activities.
- Economic growth: Higher productivity can increase profits, wages and living standards over time.
Many economists argue that AI will not simply replace workers but will change the tasks they perform. Research from the OECD suggests that even highly AI-exposed occupations continue to require management, communication, collaboration and social skills that technologies struggle to replicate.
The potential costs
At the same time, AI may create significant labour-market challenges. Many white-collar occupations previously considered relatively safe from automation are becoming vulnerable. Generative AI systems can draft reports, analyse legal documents, write computer code and create marketing content. This means that some professional and administrative roles may face considerable disruption.
The World Economic Forum reports that business leaders have differing expectations about the effects of AI. In a 2026 survey (see link below), around 54 per cent expected AI to displace existing jobs, while only 24 per cent expected it to create new jobs within their organisations. Economists have identified several potential problems:
- Structural unemployment: workers in industries that are in decline may struggle to find employment requiring their existing skills.
- Increased income inequality: there may be a growing income disparity between highly skilled and less-skilled workers.
- Growing market power: the largest technology firms that own the most advanced AI systems may see their market power grow further creating dominance in certain areas.
- Regional inequalities: AI-related investment may become concentrated in particular cities and countries, exacerbating regional inequalities within and between countries.
- Pressure on governments: to address issues of structural unemployment and increasing inequality, governments may be forced to expand retraining and social-support programmes.
AI and catastrophic risk
Most economic discussion around AI focuses on employment and productivity. However, some researchers argue that the most significant risks from AI may be much broader.
Economists distinguish between ordinary risks and catastrophic risks. Catastrophic risks involve events with a very low probability of occurring but potentially enormous consequences. Examples include nuclear accidents, pandemics and certain climate-related disasters.
AI raises similar concerns. Advanced AI systems could potentially be used to conduct cyberattacks, spread misinformation, disrupt critical infrastructure or support the development of dangerous technologies. Some researchers have even suggested that highly advanced AI systems could pose an existential risk to humanity if they become sufficiently powerful and are not properly controlled.
This became a widely discussed topic in the media in September 2026 following the resignation of an employee, Jacob Coxon, from AI firm, Anthropic. He said that people working on AI were ‘genuinely frightened’ about how quickly AI was advancing and what it might mean for the future of humanity. He said:
I believe that if we don’t slow down at the current rate of progress, there is a strong chance that we could all die in the immediate future.
Other researchers have raised similar concerns and there have since been calls from some of the biggest AI companies for regulation of AI to prevent this.
The policy debate and CBA
All of this creates a challenge for cost-benefit analysis. Suppose AI generates trillions of pounds of economic benefits. But, if there is also a very small probability of catastrophic harm, how should policymakers weigh up the two?
Traditional cost-benefit analysis values risk by multiplying the size of a potential outcome by its probability. However, this approach becomes problematic when both the probability and the consequences are highly uncertain. The risks may be extremely difficult to estimate, while the potential costs could be vast and affect future generations. For this reason, governments and firms increasingly use scenario analysis, stress testing and AI safety assessments to evaluate potential risks. These approaches attempt to prepare for extreme outcomes rather than relying solely on probability calculations.
Supporters of AI argue that technological progress has historically improved living standards and that restricting AI too heavily could reduce innovation and economic growth. Critics argue that uncertainty about potentially catastrophic outcomes justifies a more cautious approach.
The debate therefore extends beyond labour economics to the wider issue of managing catastrophic risk. As with nuclear power or climate change, policymakers must decide how much risk society is willing to accept in exchange for potentially large economic benefits.
Articles
- Why are there concerns AI could threaten humanity, and how real are they?
BBC News, Liv McMahon (17/9/26)
- Two dire warnings, one from Terence Tao, the other from someone who just quit Anthropic
Marcus on AI, Gary Marcus (9/9/26)
- AI insiders fear extinction. Security experts see a familiar fight
Scientific American, Peter Hall (11/9/26)
- US rejects pleas from OpenAI, Anthropic for global AI standards
BBC News, Kali Hays (24/9/26)
- How would AI actually kill all humans? Here are the top 5 scenarios
The Conversation, Toby Walsh (22/9/26)
- Who’s Who In The Fight Over Whether AI Will Kill Us
Forbes, Andréa Morris (24/9/26)
- Why this AI doomsday warning from former Anthropic researcher broke through
The Guardian, Blake Montgomery (15/9/26)
As AI behavior raises concerns, ex-researcher Jacob Coxon warns what may lie ahead
PBS News
‘A setup’: Elon Musk fuels wild theory about Anthropic whistleblower Jacob Coxon
ABC News, Harrison Christian (11/9/26)
- Sam Altman, Dario Amodei urge UN Security Council to adopt international AI standards
CNN, Hadas Gold (24/9/26)
- Not everyone thinks AI will kill us all
CNN, Hadas Gold and Clare Duffy (24/9/26)
- The turbulent AI era is here. The choices we make now are critical.
Gates Notes, Bill Gates (26/8/26)
Reports
Questions
- How might AI increase productivity while also causing unemployment in some sectors? Which sectors are likely to be affected the most?
- Why is it difficult to estimate the costs and benefits of advanced AI?
- Assume that a disaster is estimated to cost society £1000 billion (£1 000 000 000 000). The chances of the disaster occurring are said to be minute, however. Estimates vary from a probability of one in a million to one in a billion. What estimate of this cost would you include in a cost–benefit analysis?
- Why are many low-income countries apparently prepared to accept riskier projects than are high-income ones?
- Discuss whether the greatest economic challenge posed by AI is (a) job displacement; (b) increased inequality; (c) market concentration and the power of large technology firms; or (d) catastrophic long-term risks.
- Read the article by Bill Gates, The turbulent AI era is here. The choices we make now are critical. According to him, what steps should the world take to ensure that ‘AI will be a force for good and leave everyone better off’?
A previous post detailed how Netflix and Paramount Skydance were competing to acquire part or all of Warner Bros. Discovery (WBD). In December 2025, Netflix announced that it had agreed a deal to buy WBD’s studio and streaming service business. However, Paramount has still pursued a hostile takeover of WBD.
In mid-February 2026, it emerged that WBD had reopened talks with Paramount. Paramount was given a week to make its final offer. Then, under the agreed deal, Netflix would have the right to adjust its bid. Things have developed quickly since then.
Paramount raised its offer price by $1 per share making the deal worth a total of $111bn. WBD stated that this was superior to Netflix’s offer and Netflix declined to increase its bid. Netflix executives stated that:
This transaction was always a ‘nice to have’ at the right price, not a ‘must have’ at any price.1
Paramount will also pay Netflix the $2.8bn fee WBD owes Netflix for terminating the deal.
Whilst it appears Paramount has won the race to acquire WBD, the deal still needs regulatory clearance from competition authorities in the USA and Europe. Paramount CEO, David Ellison, stated that the proposal offered WBD shareholders ‘superior value, certainty and speed to closing.’2
Should the deal go through, the merged company would be in a powerful position as one of the few remaining Hollywood film and television studios.
References
- Paramount set for $111bn Warner Bros takeover after Netflix drops bid
BBC News, Danielle Kaye and Nardine Saad (26/2/26)
- Ibid
Articles
Questions
- What are the similarities and differences between Netflix’ and YouTube’s business models? How close substitutes do you think they are?
- Do you think cinemas are a closer or more distant substitute to Netflix than YouTube?
- Which of the possible deals, do you think, raised the most competition concerns? What might be a possible remedy that could alleviate these concerns?
- Was WBD’s decision to accept the Paramount takeover purely determined by the size of Paramount’s bid?
- What is the significance of legacy assets to the acquisition of WBD?
The television streaming market is currently attracting considerable attention from policy makers. This follows Warner Bros. accepting Netflix’s offer to buy part of the company for $72bn. To understand how this deal came about and why there is policy concern, we need to go back a few years.
The media and entertainment conglomerate Warner Bros. Discovery (WBD) was created in 2022 when AT&T sold Warner Bros to Discovery.1 However, in June 2025 the company announced that it would split the business into two parts. One would be (a) the studio for TV and movie production, where for example the Harry Potter franchises were made, and (b) the TV streaming business, home to for example the hit TV series Succession. The other, the more traditional and declining TV networks, including channels such as CNN, Discovery and TNT Sports, would form a new company called Discovery Global. David Zaslav, WBD President and Chief Executive stated that:
We are empowering these iconic brands with the sharper focus and strategic flexibility they need to compete most effectively in today’s evolving media landscape.2
Shortly afterwards, rival media and entertainment conglomerate, Paramount Skydance, made a series of bids to purchase the entire WBD business. But these were rejected by the WBD board. Despite this, in October 2025 WBD made public that it was open to a sale and had received unsolicited interest from several companies. It was believed that this included offers from Comcast and Netflix.
Recent developments
In December 2025, Netflix announced that it had agreed a deal with WBD to buy its studio and streaming service business, including its back catalogue of shows. The deal is planned to be put to WBD shareholders in the next few months.3 Netflix has over 300m subscribers across the globe and streams popular shows, such as Stranger Things and Squid Games.
Despite this accepted offer, Paramount has subsequently pursued a hostile takeover of WBD by going straight to its shareholders. In addition, Paramount launched a lawsuit to get further information on how Netflix was chosen as the buyer and to provide WBD shareholders with information on the value of the TV network business that WBD was selling. This, however, was quickly thrown out of the courts.
Over time, Netflix and Paramount have tinkered with their bids to make them more attractive to WBD. Whilst Paramount’s bid was all cash, originally Netflix was offering a mixture of cash and shares. However, in January, it switched this to an all-cash offer. In February, Paramount made clear that if WBD instead accepted its offer, it would pay the $2.8bn termination fee that would be owed to Netflix.4 Furthermore, from early 2027 Paramount would pay WBD shareholders payments of $650m per quarter, known as ticking fees, if combining WBD and Paramount faced regulatory delay.
In mid-February 2026, it emerged that, following a waiver from Netflix, WBD had reopened talks with Paramount. Paramount was given a week to make its offer. Then, under the agreed deal, Netflix would have the right to adjust its bid. This is an attempt by WBD to end the hostile bidding war Paramount is pursuing and to provide clarity for its shareholders. WBD has reiterated that it will:
continue to recommend and remain fully committed to our transaction with Netflix. [However], we welcome the opportunity to engage with you and expeditiously determine whether Paramount Skydance can deliver an actionable, binding proposal that provides superior value.5
The insertion of the ticking fees by Paramount is in response to the substantial attention competition authorities across the globe are paying to the acquisition of WBD. The deal is being investigated by the US Department of Justice and, in early February, Netflix was questioned by the US Senate Antitrust Sub-committee. During this hearing, one of the Senators expressed his anger with the country’s competition laws and raised concerns that the deal would result in Netflix getting:
more power over consumers and leaving fewer alternatives and streaming platforms.6
While Paramount did not attend this hearing, it is believed that it has raised concerns about the Netflix-WBD deal to regulators. Netflix co-CEO, Ted Sarandos, has also met with Donald Trump to discuss the deal. However, Trump subsequently stated that the deal ‘could be a problem’.7
The EU and UK markets
Furthermore, whilst all the companies involved are American, both the mergers with Netflix and Paramount are being investigated by the European Commission as markets in Europe would be affected.
In the UK, a group of politicians and former policymakers, have written to the Competition and Markets Authority urging it to conduct a full investigation of the Netflix-WBD merger. The letter argues that the merger could have:
damaging consequences for consumers, the UK’s world-leading creative industries and the UK cinema industry.
and that:
At a time when the British consumer can ill-afford more price increases, Netflix would possess an unprecedented ability to raise prices to access television and films.8
The letter comes at a time when pressure is being placed on the CMA to adopt a generally more business-friendly approach.
The impact of the merger on the UK market is particularly complicated since Warner Bros.’ streaming service, HBO Max, is only due to launch in the UK in March 2026. This is still the plan, with WBD’s head of global streaming, Jean-Briac Perette acknowledging that:
We are likely the last scaled global streamer to come to market. We’ve tried to learn from the rest. We’re a complementary and distinct service to the more volume-driven or basic cable-like streamers in the market. More is not better. Better is better.9
An alternative route to regulatory approval
An easier route to regulatory approval may well be instrumental in allowing Netflix or Paramount to win the battle for WBD. Netflix stresses that the deal will create economic growth and jobs. Netflix’s Sarandos highlighted that:
This is not a typical media merger where you end up with what’s called the Noah’s Ark problem — two of everything. We are buying a company that has assets that we do not, and we will keep investing in those.10
The problem of economic power
In contrast, critics argue that either of the deals would create a new company with too much power. However, given the nature of the firms involved, the competition issues will be fundamentally different between the two deals.
The Paramount deal would primarily reduce the number of studios in the market. This could provide the new merged studio with more bargaining power over distributors, advertisers and creators. Ultimately, this could negatively impact on the final product that consumers watch in the cinema and on television.
The Netflix deal on the other hand would impact directly on the streaming market. In the USA, 80% of consumers have both Netflix and HBO Max.11 After the merger, consumers would have less choice of competing services and Netflix-HBO Max combined may well have an incentive to raise its subscription prices.
In the UK, there are currently three leading streaming services: Netflix, Amazon Prime and Disney+, each with around 23% of the market.12 The merger with WBD could allow Netflix to become the clear market leader.
Concerns about YouTube
When examining streaming markets in all countries, an important factor will be whether to include YouTube in the market. Netflix certainly argues that it is a key competitor, at the hearing Sarandos stated that:
we are competing for the same content, we are competing for the same viewers, we are competing often for the same ad dollars. YouTube is not just cat videos anymore. YouTube is TV.13
If YouTube is included, in the USA it would be the market leader with 13%, ahead of Netflix on 9%. However, the competition authorities may conclude that YouTube’s product and business model is sufficiently different and so not include it in the streaming market.14
The issue of cinemas
A second concern in the Netflix deal will be the Warner Bros.’ studio content that Netflix would own. The merged business may have an incentive to discontinue, raise the price or reduce the quality of the studio output that it supplies to cinemas. Thus, the competition authorities’ investigations will also pay close attention to the impact on the cinema market.
In line with these arguments, the Hollywood screenwriters’ union, the Writers Guild of America, has indicated that the Netflix-WMD deal should be stopped and filmmakers are clearly concerned about Netflix prioritising streaming.15
The competition authorities may well consider imposing remedies before they are willing to allow either deal to go ahead. With this in mind, it is interesting that Netflix has already made clear that it will continue the 45-day exclusive window that Warner Bros. provides cinemas to show its films.
It will be fascinating to see how the competing bids play out and how the competition regulators view them.
* * *
This post has been updated in a Postscript, following a further bid from Paramount that was not matched by Netflix.
References
- AT&T agrees deal to combine WarnerMedia with Discovery
The Guardian, Mark Sweney (16/5/21)
- HBO and CNN owner to split streaming and cable businesses
BBC News, Adam Hancock (10/6/25)
- Netflix’s co-CEO went to an antitrust hearing and a culture war broke out
NBC News, Saba Hamedy (3/2/26)
- Warner Bros gives Paramount seven days to make ‘best and final’ offer
The Guardian, Mark Sweney (17/2/26)
- ibid.
- NBC News, op. cit.
- Trump says $72bn Netflix-Warner Bros deal ‘could be a problem’
BBC News, Osmond Chia (8/12/25)
- UK politicians call for competition review of Netflix bid for Warner Bros
Financial Times (26/1/26)
- Warner streaming boss defends HBO Max UK launch ahead of Netflix takeover
Financial Times (9/2/26)
- NBC News, op. cit.
- Netflix and Warner Bros struggle to defend merger
BBC News, Danielle Kaye (3/2/26)
- Netflix, Disney+, Prime: Streaming platform market share report UK 2025
InsiderMedia, Jennifer O’Keeffe (2/12/25)
- BBC News, Danielle Kaye op. cit.
- Paramount sweetens Warner Bros bid with offer to pay Netflix break-up cost, other fees
Reuters, Harshita Mary Varghese and Aditya Soni (11/2/26)
- In a takeover of Warner Bros., Netflix makes a play for 21st century Hollywood’s throne
NBC News, Daniel Arkin (5/12/25)
Articles
Questions
- What are the similarities and differences between Netflix’ and YouTube’s business models? How close substitutes do you think they are?
- Do you think cinemas are a closer or more distant substitute to Netflix than YouTube?
- Which deal do you think raises the most competition concerns? What might be a possible remedy that could alleviate these concerns?
In my previous blog post on this site, I examined how AI-powered pricing tools can act as a ‘double-edged sword’: offering efficiency gains, while also creating opportunities for collusion. I referred to one of the early examples of this, which was the case involving Trod Ltd and GB Eye, where two online poster and frame sellers on Amazon used pricing algorithms to monitor and adjust their prices. However, in this instance there was also an explicit agreement between the firms. As some commentators put it, it was ‘old wine in new bottles‘, meaning a fairly conventional cartel that was simply facilitated through digital tools.
Since then, algorithms have increasingly become part of everyday life and are now embedded in routine business practice.
Some of the effects may have a positive effect on competition. For example, algorithms can help to lower barriers to entry. In some markets, incumbents benefit from long-standing experience, while new firms face significant learning costs and are at a disadvantage. By reducing these learning costs and supporting entry, algorithms could contribute to making collusion harder to sustain.
On the other hand, algorithms could increase the likelihood of collusion. For example, individual algorithms used by competing firms may respond to market conditions in predictable ways, making it easier for firms to collude tacitly over time.
Algorithms can also improve the ability of firms to monitor each other’s prices. This is particularly relevant for multi-product firms. Traditionally, we might expect these markets to be less prone to collusion because co-ordinating across many products is complex. AI can overcome this complexity. In the Sainsbury’s/Asda merger case, for example, the Competition and Markets Authority suggested that the main barrier to reaching and monitoring a pricing agreement was the complexity of pricing across such a wide range of products. However, the CMA also suggested that technological advances could increase its ability to do so in the future.
The ‘hub-and-spoke’ model
One of the other growing concerns is the ability of AI pricing algorithms to facilitate collusion by acting as a ‘hub’ in a ‘hub-and-spoke’ arrangement. In this type of collusion, competing firms (the ‘spokes’) need not communicate directly with one another. Instead, the ‘hub’ helps them to co-ordinate their actions.
While there have been only limited examples of an AI pricing algorithm acting as a hub in practice, what once seemed to be a largely theoretical concern has now become a live enforcement issue.
A very recent example is the RealPage case in the United States. The Department of Justice (DOJ) filed an antitrust lawsuit against RealPage Inc. in August 2024, alleging that RealPage, acting as the ‘hub’, facilitated collusion between landlords (the ‘spokes’).
RealPage provided pricing software to numerous landlords, including the largest landlord in the USA, which manages around 950 000 rental units across the country. These landlords would normally compete independently in setting rental prices, discounts and lease terms to win consumers. However, by feeding competitively sensitive information that would not usually be shared between rivals into RealPage’s system, the software generated pricing recommendations that, according to the DOJ, led to co-ordinated rent increases across competing apartment complexes.
I
n the RealPage case, the authorities reported that they had access to internal documents and statements from the parties involved, which helped support their allegations. These included references within RealPage to helping landlords ‘avoid the race to the bottom’ and comments from a landlord describing the software as ‘classic price fixing’.
Evidence in these cases really matters because the standard of proof required to establish a hub-and-spoke arrangement is much higher than for traditional cases of explicit collusion. This is because it can be difficult to distinguish between legitimate and anti-competitive communication between retailers and suppliers. Also, proving ‘anti-competitive intent’ is inherently challenging.
Other competition authorities around the world are also turning their attention to these issues. For example, the European Commission recently announced that a number of investigations into algorithmic pricing are underway, signalling a clear shift toward more active scrutiny. As technology continues to advance, it is clear that algorithmic pricing will remain an area where both firms and authorities must move and adapt quickly.
Articles
Questions
- In what ways does the RealPage case differ from the earlier Trod Ltd and GB Eye Ltd case? Consider the roles played by the firms, the nature of the alleged co-ordination, and the extent to which pricing algorithms were used to facilitate the conduct.
- How might the use of pricing algorithms affect the likelihood of firms colluding, either explicitly or tacitly? Consider ways that algorithms may make collusion easier to sustain but also ways in which they may reduce its likelihood.
- Should firms be held liable for anti-competitive outcomes produced by algorithms that ‘self-learn’, even if they did not intend those outcomes? Explain why or why not.