Category: Essential Economics for Business: Ch 06

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A grocery duopoly: New Zealand supermarkets



The grocery retail market in New Zealand is worth billions of dollars each year and is one of the most concentrated supermarket sectors in the world. The industry is dominated by two large groups: Foodstuffs and Woolworths New Zealand. Together, these firms account for around 80–90 per cent of grocery sales, with Foodstuffs operating brands such as Pak’nSave, New World and Four Square, while Woolworths operates the Woolworths supermarket chain.

The market displays many of the characteristics of an oligopoly. The two dominant firms compete through store location, loyalty schemes, advertising and product range, and to some extent through pricing. At the same time, they benefit from substantial economies of scale, extensive distribution networks and strong relationships with suppliers. These factors mean that there are significant barriers to entry in the market and this can prevent new firms from entering the market and surviving.

Competition concerns

Concern about competition in the sector has led to investigations by New Zealand’s Commerce Commission. The Commission concluded that although there was competition in the market, it was less than optimal and both firms were earning higher profits than they would have been able to earn had they been in operating in a more competitive market.

It identified various barriers to entry that limited competition, including access to suitable retail sites, ownership of distribution networks and the difficulty of establishing large-scale supply chains in a country with a relatively small population.

Despite the market being dominated by these two big firms, there are also many smaller retailers operating within the market, including independent grocery stores, convenience stores and specialist food retailers. However, they lack the scale that is needed to challenge the dominance of Foodstuffs and Woolworths at a national level.

Potential international entrants, such as Aldi and Lidl, have often been suggested as possible competitors, but the costs of establishing a nationwide network of stores and distribution facilities in New Zealand are significant. There have been examples of large and dominant supermarkets in one country attempting to enter the market in other countries but failing to survive or deciding to exit the market early. For example, Tesco entered the Chinese market in 2004 but, despite its efforts, exited the market in 2020.

Response by the New Zealand government

In response to concerns about competition, the New Zealand government has introduced a series of measures designed to make market entry easier. These include restrictions on anti-competitive land covenants, the introduction of a Grocery Commissioner and changes intended to improve access to wholesale grocery supply.

But, despite these measures, recent reports suggest that the overall market structure has changed little, with the two major firms continuing to dominate grocery retailing.

The public interest

Supporters of the current market structure argue that large supermarket chains deliver lower costs through economies of scale and provide consumers with extensive product choice.

Critics counter that limited competition leads to higher prices, reduced innovation and weaker bargaining power for suppliers.

The debate illustrates the difficulties faced by policymakers when attempting to balance efficiency against the promotion of competition.

Whether greater competition will emerge in the future remains uncertain. Much will depend on whether existing reforms can encourage new entrants or whether the structural advantages enjoyed by Foodstuffs and Woolworths continue to deter potential rivals.

Articles

Questions

  1. What are the characteristics of the New Zealand supermarket industry that create barriers to entry for new firms?
  2. To what extent is the New Zealand grocery market consistent with the characteristics of an oligopoly?
  3. Evaluate the likely effectiveness of government measures designed to increase competition in the supermarket sector.
  4. Australia too has two main supermarket chains: Coles and Woolworths. However, Aldi has entered the Australian market and in some parts of the country had provided significant competition to the two major chians. Why may Aldi have more difficulty in entering the New Zealnd market
  5. Investigate the grocery retail market in another country (not the UK). Who are the major competitors and what is their market share? What barriers to entry exist? Has the competition authority expressed concerns about the market and if so, what are they?
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AI: benefits but catastrophic risk



Artificial intelligence (AI) has become a key technology in the 21st Century. Businesses use AI systems to analyse data, automate routine tasks, improve customer service, write software, create content and even assist with decision-making. As AI improves and becomes even more capable, governments, economists, businesses and society are debating its effects on productivity, employment and economic growth – and also its potentially extreme dangers.

Some commentators compare AI to earlier technological revolutions such as the steam engine, electricity and the Internet. They argue that AI will continue to increase productivity, create new industries and improve living standards. Others worry that AI may eliminate a large numbers of jobs, increase inequality, concentrate economic power in a few firms and, in the most extreme scenarios, pose a threat to humanity itself.

These debates raise important questions including how society should evaluate the potential risks of a technology whose benefits may be enormous but whose long-term consequences remain uncertain.

AI and the labour market

Historically, technological change has had both positive and negative effects on employment. Automation reduced the demand for many agricultural workers, while creating jobs in manufacturing. Computers automated clerical tasks but generated entirely new industries in software, telecommunications and digital services.

AI appears likely to follow a similar pattern. According to the World Economic Forum, advances in AI, robotics and information-processing technologies are expected to transform labour markets significantly during the second half of the 2020s, creating demand for new skills while reducing demand for others. The fastest-growing skills are expected to include AI and big data, technological literacy and cybersecurity.

The potential benefits

AI may benefit labour markets in several ways:

  • Higher productivity: Workers can complete tasks more quickly with AI assistance.
  • New occupations: Demand has emerged for AI engineers, prompt specialists, data scientists and AI governance professionals.
  • Better decision-making: Firms can use AI to improve forecasting, inventory management and customer service.
  • Complementing human skills: AI may perform repetitive tasks, allowing employees to focus on creativity, problem-solving and interpersonal activities.
  • Economic growth: Higher productivity can increase profits, wages and living standards over time.

Many economists argue that AI will not simply replace workers but will change the tasks they perform. Research from the OECD suggests that even highly AI-exposed occupations continue to require management, communication, collaboration and social skills that technologies struggle to replicate.

The potential costs

At the same time, AI may create significant labour-market challenges. Many white-collar occupations previously considered relatively safe from automation are becoming vulnerable. Generative AI systems can draft reports, analyse legal documents, write computer code and create marketing content. This means that some professional and administrative roles may face considerable disruption.

The World Economic Forum reports that business leaders have differing expectations about the effects of AI. In a 2026 survey (see link below), around 54 per cent expected AI to displace existing jobs, while only 24 per cent expected it to create new jobs within their organisations. Economists have identified several potential problems:

  • Structural unemployment: workers in industries that are in decline may struggle to find employment requiring their existing skills.
  • Increased income inequality: there may be a growing income disparity between highly skilled and less-skilled workers.
  • Growing market power: the largest technology firms that own the most advanced AI systems may see their market power grow further creating dominance in certain areas.
  • Regional inequalities: AI-related investment may become concentrated in particular cities and countries, exacerbating regional inequalities within and between countries.
  • Pressure on governments: to address issues of structural unemployment and increasing inequality, governments may be forced to expand retraining and social-support programmes.

AI and catastrophic risk

Most economic discussion around AI focuses on employment and productivity. However, some researchers argue that the most significant risks from AI may be much broader.

Economists distinguish between ordinary risks and catastrophic risks. Catastrophic risks involve events with a very low probability of occurring but potentially enormous consequences. Examples include nuclear accidents, pandemics and certain climate-related disasters.

AI raises similar concerns. Advanced AI systems could potentially be used to conduct cyberattacks, spread misinformation, disrupt critical infrastructure or support the development of dangerous technologies. Some researchers have even suggested that highly advanced AI systems could pose an existential risk to humanity if they become sufficiently powerful and are not properly controlled.

This became a widely discussed topic in the media in September 2026 following the resignation of an employee, Jacob Coxon, from AI firm, Anthropic. He said that people working on AI were ‘genuinely frightened’ about how quickly AI was advancing and what it might mean for the future of humanity. He said:

I believe that if we don’t slow down at the current rate of progress, there is a strong chance that we could all die in the immediate future.

Other researchers have raised similar concerns and there have since been calls from some of the biggest AI companies for regulation of AI to prevent this.

The policy debate and CBA

All of this creates a challenge for cost-benefit analysis. Suppose AI generates trillions of pounds of economic benefits. But, if there is also a very small probability of catastrophic harm, how should policymakers weigh up the two?

Traditional cost-benefit analysis values risk by multiplying the size of a potential outcome by its probability. However, this approach becomes problematic when both the probability and the consequences are highly uncertain. The risks may be extremely difficult to estimate, while the potential costs could be vast and affect future generations. For this reason, governments and firms increasingly use scenario analysis, stress testing and AI safety assessments to evaluate potential risks. These approaches attempt to prepare for extreme outcomes rather than relying solely on probability calculations.

Supporters of AI argue that technological progress has historically improved living standards and that restricting AI too heavily could reduce innovation and economic growth. Critics argue that uncertainty about potentially catastrophic outcomes justifies a more cautious approach.

The debate therefore extends beyond labour economics to the wider issue of managing catastrophic risk. As with nuclear power or climate change, policymakers must decide how much risk society is willing to accept in exchange for potentially large economic benefits.

Articles

Reports

Questions

  1. How might AI increase productivity while also causing unemployment in some sectors? Which sectors are likely to be affected the most?
  2. Why is it difficult to estimate the costs and benefits of advanced AI?
  3. Assume that a disaster is estimated to cost society £1000 billion (£1 000 000 000 000). The chances of the disaster occurring are said to be minute, however. Estimates vary from a probability of one in a million to one in a billion. What estimate of this cost would you include in a cost–benefit analysis?
  4. Why are many low-income countries apparently prepared to accept riskier projects than are high-income ones?
  5. Discuss whether the greatest economic challenge posed by AI is (a) job displacement; (b) increased inequality; (c) market concentration and the power of large technology firms; or (d) catastrophic long-term risks.
  6. Read the article by Bill Gates, The turbulent AI era is here. The choices we make now are critical. According to him, what steps should the world take to ensure that ‘AI will be a force for good and leave everyone better off’?
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The liquidity – return trade-off: Lessons from private credit funds

Wobbles in the private credit market in the fourth quarter of 2025 spooked those retail investors with investments in private credit funds – a significant segment of the growing shadow banking sector. These funds use investors’ money to finance lending to businesses and individuals who struggle to, or do not want to, access credit from banks and the public market. Therefore, the risks are higher.

The failures of two auto parts suppliers in the USA last year have highlighted the risks involved. Retail investors are exiting such funds in significant numbers. Bcred, Blackstone’s $82 billion private credit fund, saw money equivalent to 8% of its net asset value (NAV) withdrawn. The firm, and employees, put $400m in to maintain confidence.

Blue Owl, another credit manager, closed investors’ usual quarterly redemption window, largely due to unprecedented demand. The fund’s managers have decided that they will wind down the fund and return money back to investors over time, whether that want it or not.

Several other listed funds run by big names, such as Blackrock and KKR, have slashed dividends and written down asset values. This week, both Morgan Stanley and Cliffwater limited withdrawals from their credit funds.

So, what has happened? In recent years, there has been a big growth in private credit funds in the USA aimed at individual retail investors. With interest margins low and fees from public investment products diminishing due to the shift to passive investing, financial institutions spied an opportunity for chunky fees by offering private credit investment to retail investors.

The liquidity–return trade-off

Such investors are attracted by the potential for higher returns that private credit funds offered compared to public funds. The need to provide higher returns was related partly to the higher credit risk associated with the lending, but also to the illiquidity of the private credit assets that the funds invested in.

While much attention in the financial media has focused on the heightened credit risk in private funds, less attention has been given to the liquidity issue. At the heart of the private credit business model is a level of illiquidity that individual retail investors would not be comfortable with. The liquidity–return trade-off is one of the fundamental concepts in finance. Investors must be prepared to trade-off liquidity for higher returns, and vice versa. They cannot have both.

This blog will discuss that trade-off in the context of private credit funds and its lessons for retail investors, particularly in Europe where institutions are gearing up to offer such investment products.

Liquidity preference

One of the fundamental concepts in finance is the maturity mismatch between the preferences of ultimate lenders (typically households) and the requirements of ultimate borrowers (typically firms, but also households and governments too). Typically, lenders want to ‘lend short’ while borrowers want to ‘borrow long’. The financial system reconciles this mismatch by providing two important economic functions – maturity transformation and liquidity provision.

Banks offer maturity transformation by offering current and other accounts to individuals where deposits can be redeemed at short notice. These institutions use the deposits to finance long-term lending for a variety of purposes; examples include property, investment in capital or day-to-day spending. Their effective management of this process is important economically for the smooth running of the payments mechanism and for economic growth.

But, to fulfil this, banks have to hold a mixture of assets with varying degrees of liquidity – some highly liquid, such as cash and short-term government debt instruments, and some illiquid, such as long-term loans. Liquidity is such an important issue for banks that their assets are listed on their balance sheet in order of liquidity – from most liquid to least liquid.

However, there is an inverse relationship between liquidity and expected return. Banks and their customers have to sacrifice return if they want higher liquidity. Therefore, liquid assets tend to offer a low rate of return and illiquid assets a higher rate of return. Consequently, in order to retain sufficient liquidity, the overall return banks can generate is limited compared to a situation where they invest wholly in illiquid assets.

If individuals want to invest directly in long-term financial assets, such as debt and equity, there must be a secondary market where these can be bought and sold – the stock market. Without this mechanism providing liquidity, individuals are less likely to invest in these assets in the first place. Few would want to wait for a debt security to mature or hold a share in perpetuity. Secondary markets mean they don’t have to.

Liquidity and private credit

Private credit funds have existed for a long time as part of the shadow banking sector and have grown in scale. Such funds invest in non-tradable, long-term illiquid loans as a parallel to the better-known private equity sector. Traditionally they have been targeted at institutional investors, who are more comfortable with the higher credit risk and illiquidity involved.

However, while institutions are prepared to forgo liquidity for many years in expectation of higher returns, individual retail investors are not – they have a higher liquidity preference. Funds tailoring private credit funds acknowledged that individual investors required a liquidity incentive to invest. Since there is no liquid secondary market to facilitate liquidation, private funds aimed at such retail investors offered quarterly redemption opportunities. The industry standard settled on around 5% of a fund’s value.

However, offering these ‘liquidity windows’ creates a tension in the private credit business model. Private credit operates on the basis of illiquidity in return for higher returns. This includes borrowers prepared to pay a higher interest rate on debt to avoid exposure to the glare of public market scrutiny.

Further, the prices of private loans are not ‘marked-to-the-market’ like publicly traded debt, so they are not correlated with public markets. This enables fund managers to work out credit problems over time rather than be forced into fire sales to meet the liquidity needs of investors.

Offering liquidity confounds that. To do so, private credit funds end up operating like quasi-public funds. They have to hold sufficient liquid assets to cover redemptions. Indeed, regulations for such funds in Europe are proposing a minimum of 20% of assets in liquid investments so there is a reserve to meet redemptions. But, by doing so, funds will not be able to generate the promised returns. Indeed, returns may be not much higher that that offered by public traded funds.

Further, providing quarterly redemption windows requires fair and timely valuations of the fund. Irrespective of perceptions around credit risk, if investors feel that the valuation is generous then many will want to take advantage of the liquidity window to redeem and no limit on withdrawals, be it 5%, 10% or whatever, is sufficient. However, with no secondary market mechanism to remove the excess demand, those told they cannot redeem their investment will only increase their demands for liquidity further and exit at the next available opportunity.

This irreconcilable tension in offering private credit funds to retail investors is being recognised. Not only are funds like Blue Owl being wound up, but the share prices of providers in the USA have fallen sharply as markets realise that the anticipated returns from selling private credit to retail investors are unlikely to be realised. Blackstone’s market capitalisation has halved from $250 billion at the end of 2024 to $134 billion on 11 March 2026.

But this is the moment when private credit funds are being offered to retail investors in Europe. The lesson for European retail investors from the US experience is that you can’t have high liquidity and high return. As with most allocation decisions, there is a trade-off.

Articles

Questions

  1. What is maturity transformation? Explain how banks conduct maturity transformation.
  2. What is liquidity provision? Explain how secondary financial markets provide liquidity.
  3. Explain why private credit funds offer a higher expected return than public ones?
  4. Analyse the pressures on profit margins in public markets which led financial institutions to offer private credit funds. In doing so, consider the ethics around offering such a product to retail investors.
  5. Explain why offering such funds to individual (retail) investors has not worked.
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When suppliers become the captains: Is Red Bull clipping rivals’ wiiings?

When we think about suppliers and retailers working together, we usually imagine negotiations over things like the price a retailer pays for products, the quantities ordered, or delivery schedules. However, some suppliers do much more than simply supplying products. In fact, suppliers to many supermarkets also advise them on which brands to stock, how much shelf space each brand should get, and which products to promote. In this role, known as a ‘category captain’, a supplier can influence not only its own products but also those of its competitors within a specific category of products.

For example, if Red Bull were acting as a category captain in the energy drinks category for a supermarket like Tesco, it could also advise on where its competitor, Monster Energy, appears on the shelves, or even whether it appears at all!

Sounds problematic? Arrangements like these are an example of vertical relationships between suppliers and retailers, something economists often study. Like other vertical arrangements, such as exclusive dealing, they can have both benefits and drawbacks. For example, while a category captain can result in efficiency gains, allow for a more organised category of products and improve consumer choice, it also raises questions when the supplier giving the advice also competes with the products it is advising on.

That is exactly what the European Commission (EC), the EU’s competition authority, began examining in November 2025, when it opened an investigation into potential anticompetitive conduct by Red Bull.

One of the key concerns is whether Red Bull used its role as a category captain to disadvantage competing energy drink brands.

Category management is common … but novel for enforcement

The practice of appointing a category captain is not new. Many large supermarkets appoint category captains from major consumer goods suppliers. For example, firms such as Kraft Foods and Procter & Gamble have long taken on category management roles in a range of consumer-packaged goods categories.

However, despite how common these arrangements are in retail, this is the first time the EC has formally investigated whether a supplier has misused its category management role to limit or disadvantage competing products, and it has said it will treat the case as a priority.

How Red Bull could be disadvantaging competitors

According to the Commission, Red Bull appears to hold a dominant position in the wholesale supply of branded energy drinks, at least in The Netherlands. In competition policy, a firm which holds a dominant position has a special responsibility to ensure that its actions do not unfairly restrict competition. Regulators are investigating whether the company abused this position by offering financial or non-financial incentives and/or leveraging its role as a category captain to disadvantage competing energy drinks sold in larger can sizes.

At an extreme, a category captain could advise a supermarket to stop selling a competitor’s product entirely, effectively excluding the brand from the shelves and potentially reducing consumer choice.

But there are also more subtle ways Red Bull could disadvantage its competitors. Insights from behavioural economics suggest that the placement of products on shelves can strongly influence what consumers notice and buy. By reducing the visibility of rival energy drinks, for example, products in less prominent locations are less likely to be purchased and are therefore disadvantaged.

These practices matter for consumers as well as competitors. By limiting which products are stocked or how prominently they are displayed, dominant suppliers could reduce choice and potentially keep prices higher.

Growing scrutiny of category management?

Competition authorities seem to be paying closer attention to how suppliers influence the management of product categories in retail stores. In April 2025, the Belgian Competition Authority fined three large pharmaceutical companies more than €11 million for co-ordinating the placement of over-the-counter medicines in pharmacies. The companies had created shelf layouts that favoured their own products, disadvantaged competing brands, and monitored whether pharmacies followed the plans.

Thus far there have not been many European cases related to category management.

Why the Red Bull case matters

The Red Bull investigation is the first EC case focusing specifically on the potential misuse of category management by a dominant supplier. There is currently little guidance on how these arrangements should be assessed under competition law, meaning the case could set an important precedent.

If the Commission concludes that category management was used strategically to disadvantage competitors, Red Bull could be found to have abused its dominant position under EU competition rules. Such a decision could reshape supplier–retailer relationships across Europe.

Articles

Questions

  1. Beyond prices, how might dominant suppliers influencing shelf space affect competition and consumer choice?
  2. How might category captain arrangements affect barriers to entry?
  3. What are the potential efficiencies of supplier-led category management, and what are the possible anti-competitive effects?
  4. What guidelines or safeguards could regulators provide to ensure category captains deliver the potential efficiencies without harming competition?
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Rival bids for Warner Bros. face competition scrutiny: a Postscript

A previous post detailed how Netflix and Paramount Skydance were competing to acquire part or all of Warner Bros. Discovery (WBD). In December 2025, Netflix announced that it had agreed a deal to buy WBD’s studio and streaming service business. However, Paramount has still pursued a hostile takeover of WBD.

In mid-February 2026, it emerged that WBD had reopened talks with Paramount. Paramount was given a week to make its final offer. Then, under the agreed deal, Netflix would have the right to adjust its bid. Things have developed quickly since then.

Paramount raised its offer price by $1 per share making the deal worth a total of $111bn. WBD stated that this was superior to Netflix’s offer and Netflix declined to increase its bid. Netflix executives stated that:

This transaction was always a ‘nice to have’ at the right price, not a ‘must have’ at any price.1

Paramount will also pay Netflix the $2.8bn fee WBD owes Netflix for terminating the deal.

Whilst it appears Paramount has won the race to acquire WBD, the deal still needs regulatory clearance from competition authorities in the USA and Europe. Paramount CEO, David Ellison, stated that the proposal offered WBD shareholders ‘superior value, certainty and speed to closing.’2

Should the deal go through, the merged company would be in a powerful position as one of the few remaining Hollywood film and television studios.

References

  1. Paramount set for $111bn Warner Bros takeover after Netflix drops bid

    2. BBC News, Danielle Kaye and Nardine Saad (26/2/26)

  2. Ibid

Articles

Questions

  1. What are the similarities and differences between Netflix’ and YouTube’s business models? How close substitutes do you think they are?
  2. Do you think cinemas are a closer or more distant substitute to Netflix than YouTube?
  3. Which of the possible deals, do you think, raised the most competition concerns? What might be a possible remedy that could alleviate these concerns?
  4. Was WBD’s decision to accept the Paramount takeover purely determined by the size of Paramount’s bid?
  5. What is the significance of legacy assets to the acquisition of WBD?