It is 10 years since the Brexit referendum. From an electorate of 46,501,251 people, 17,410,742 (37.4%) voted to leave, 16,141,241 (34.7%) voted to remain and 12,949,258 (27.8%) did not vote. The UK left the EU on 31 January 2020 at 11:00 pm, but remained in the single market and customs union during a transition period lasting for a further 11 months until December 31 2020.
To mark the 10th anniversary of the vote a number of articles have been written assessing the effects of Brexit. Here we look at the economic effects, as do the articles linked below. This blog updates the analysis of an earlier one, The costs of Brexit: a clearer picture.
Trade
After the referendum, extensive negotiations took place on the trading arrangements between the UK and EU that would exist once Brexit was finalised.

One possibility was ‘The Norwegian model’, which would have seen the UK join the European Economic Area (EEA), giving it access to the single market, but removing regulation in some key areas, such as fisheries and home affairs. This was ruled out in favour of a bilateral trade agreement. Three main types were available:
- Swiss model, where the UK would negotiate a series of bilateral agreements with the EU, including selective or general access to the single market.
- Canadian model, where the UK would form a comprehensive trade agreement with the EU to lower customs tariffs and other barriers to trade.
- Turkish model, where the UK would form a customs union with the EU. In Turkey’s case the agreement relates principally to manufactured goods.
The agreement reached, the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) was a version of the Canadian model. The UK would leave the single market and customs union, but there would be tariff-free and quota-free trade in goods between the UK and the EU. However, to ensure that it was EU and UK business that would benefit from these ‘trade preferences’, businesses must show that their products fulfil ‘rules of origin’ requirements.
Rules of origin. Under rules of origin requirements, when a good is imported into the UK from outside the EU and then has value added to it by processing, packaging, cleaning, remixing, preserving, refashioning, etc., it can only count as a UK good if sufficient value or weight is added. The proportions vary by product, but generally goods must have approximately 50% UK content (or 80% of the weight of foodstuffs) to qualify for tariff-free access to the EU. For example, in the case of a petrol car, 55% of its value must have been created in either the EU or UK.
Meeting rules of origin has created a large amount of paperwork for businesses and this has created a significant barrier to trade. What is more, exporters are required to complete import/export declarations. Also, agri-food goods are subject to strict physical border controls. These barriers have increased the costs of trade and reduced its volume.
Services. Free trade in services is not provided by the TCA. Instead, services exporters face various barriers, such as certain professional qualifications no longer being recognised in EU countries and a loss of ‘passporting’ rights that previously allowed cross-border financial operations with minimal extra permissions.
Brexit impact. Despite new barriers to trade in services, they are generally less significant than the barriers for trade in goods, particularly in a digital age. Indeed, UK services exports have held up well. Although they fell in 2020, they have grown significantly since. According to House of Commons Library Statistics on UK-EU trade (see link below):
In 2025, UK exports of services to the EU were 28% above their 2019 level in real terms. Exports to non-EU countries were 26% above their 2019 level.
UK exports of goods to the EU, however, have fared less well. In 2025 they were 14% below their 2019 level in real terms. This is partly the effect of COVID and the Ukraine war, but exports to non-EU countries were only 8% lower than 2019. According to research by economists John Springford and Anton Spisak for the Centre for European Reform (see link below), Brexit has depressed UK goods exports to the EU by 16%. According to the Office for Budget Responsibility, (see link below) both exports and imports in the long run will be around 15% lower than they would have been if the UK had remained in the EU. What is more, the growth of goods trade (exports plus imports) has fallen well behind the average of the rest of the G7. And according to British Chambers of Commerce research (see link below), 54% of UK exporters think the TCA is making it harder to export and the need for change is urgent.
The new barriers reduce market access, while lower export volumes reduce competition and economies of scale. There is less competition too from imports, with many EU firms no longer exporting to the UK because of the costs. The barriers lead to a misallocation of resources, with highly productive UK firms exporting less, with less productive firms in the UK and EU focusing purely on their domestic markets. The barriers thus impose an impediment to the exploitation of comparative advantage
Investment
Both domestic and foreign direct investment (FDI) in the UK have been adversely affected by Brexit. Bloom et al., in their paper for the NBER (see link below), estimate that by 2025, investment was 12–18% lower than it would have been without Brexit.
In the early years after the referendum, lower capital investment was mainly the result of uncertainty and devoting significant resources to administrative Brexit preparations. Later it was largely the result of the trade barriers themselves. Not surprisingly, firms in the UK with high exposure to EU markets experienced a sharper decline in investment than less-exposed ones.
The end of the single market and customs union reduced the attractiveness of the UK as a hub for FDI relative to competitor countries. And UK firms were encouraged to invest in the EU to create hubs for selling within the EU, thereby allowing them to avoid the trade barriers.
According to the Bloom et al. analysis, the effect of lower investment and less competition has been a fall in UK productivity of around 3% to 4% compared to remaining in the EU. The Office For Budget Responsibility argues that the post-Brexit trading relationship will reduce long-run productivity by 4% relative to remaining in the EU.
Growth in GDP
Lower investment, lower productivity and trade barriers have had a negative impact on economic growth. According to analysis by the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) (see link below), by the end of 2023, UK real GDP was some 2–3% lower solely as a result of Brexit – in other words, after having taken into account the effects of COVID-19 and the Russia-Ukraine war. This corresponds to a per capita income loss of approximately £850. The NIESR analysis predicts that this will rise to some 5–6% of GDP, or about £2,300 per capita, by 2035.
Bank of England data, based on surveys of chief financial officers of over 2000 firms (small, medium and large), suggest that the UK economy is some 6% smaller than it would have been without Brexit. The Office for Budget Responsibility estimates that Brexit has caused a long-run reduction in GDP of 4% as a result of a similar percentage reduction in productivity.
The growth of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) has been disproportionately dampened by the compliance costs of trade with the EU. Some SMEs, especially in the food and drink sector, have ceased exporting to the EU altogether.
Labour supply and migration
Halting the right of EU workers to move freely to the UK for work created acute labour shortages in specific sectors such as hospitality, health and social care, logistics, construction and agriculture. However, while immigration from the EU fell dramatically, this was more than offset by increased immigration from non-EU countries. But this was unable to fill shortfalls in some sectors.
The loss of free movement of labour means that UK workers now face restrictions on working in the EU. These include obtaining a work visa, which requires a formal job offer, sponsorship and meeting strict salary thresholds. While business trips for meetings, conferences, trade fairs, etc. are generally exempt, if the work involves remuneration, then normally a work visa will be required. The terms of work visas vary between member states. This has created a considerable barrier for touring bands and other artists. Short-term self-employed or freelance work is highly restricted, with virtually no work permit options available for visiting UK nationals.
Because employing UK nationals now imposes extra administrative and time-consuming burdens on local EU employers, many now prioritize applicants from EU nations who can start immediately.
Articles
- Ten years on, Brexit’s economic impact is becoming clearer
BBC News, Faisal Islam (24/6/26)
- How Brexit is estimated to have hit the UK economy
Reuters, David Milliken (17/6/26)
- Ten years on, Britain counts the cost of Brexit
CNN, Hanna Ziady (22/6/26)
- Brexit at 10: The economy
Institute for Government: Comment, Giles Wilkes (16/6/26)
- Brexit has been an economic failure
LSE Blogs, Thomas Sampsos (16/6/26)
- Ten years after the referendum, how Brexit could have been done differently
The Conversation, Renaud Foucart (22/6/26)
- How Brexit has made Britain poorer – in charts
The Guardian, Richard Partington (14/6/26)
- The cost of Brexit, ten years on: The impact of leaving the customs union and single market on UK trade
Centre for European Reform, John Springford and Anton Spisak (18/6/26)
- Rejoining customs union would not fix damage caused by Brexit, research finds
The Guardian, Heather Stewart (18/6/26)
- The Economic Impact of Brexit
National Bureau of Economic Research , Nicholas Bloom, Philip Bunn, Paul Mizen, Pawel Smietanka, Gregory Thwaites and Sasha Abrahams (revised June 2026)
- Brexit’s impact on the UK economy
UK in a Changing Europe: blog, Gregory Thwaites, Nicholas Bloom, Paul Mizen, Pawel Smietanka and Philip Bunn (4/12/25)
- What the NBER gets wrong on the ‘Economic Impact of Brexit’
Julian Jessop (24/11/25)
- Brexit burden must be cut
British Chambers of Commerce (22/6/26)
- Brexit impact will be negative ‘for the foreseeable future,’ Bank of England governor warns
Business Matters, Jamie Young (19/10/25)
- Brexit knocked 6% off the UK economy, Bank of England company data suggests
Business Matters, Jamie Young (22/6/26)
- Brexit ten years on: the economy
UK in a Changing Europe: blog, Jonathan Portes (2/6/26)
- Brexit 10 years later: How the UK economy and politics changed, in charts
CNBC, Joseph Wilkins and Chloe Taylor (23/6/26)
- Ten Years of Brexit: An Assessment of the Macroeconomic, Regional, and Sectoral Impacts
NIESR blog (19/6/26)
- Brexit was supposed to limit immigration – it did the opposite
LSE blogs, Alan Manning (22/6/26)
Videos
Reports, Research, Analysis and Data
- Brexit analysis
OBR
- Brexit: research and analysis
UK Parliament
- Brexit analyses
Centre for Economic Performance (LSE)
- Trading relationship with the EU
House of Commons Library, Ilze Jozepa, Dominic Webb and Matthew Ward (25/4/25)
- Statistics on UK-EU trade
House of Commons Library, Matthew Ward and Dominic Webb (12/6/26)
- How are our Brexit trade forecast assumptions performing?
Office for Budget Responsibility, Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2024, Box 2.4
- Revisiting the Effect of Brexit
National Institute of Economic and Social Research, Ahmet Ihsan Kaya, Iana Liadze, Hailey Low, Patricia Sánchez Juanino and Stephen Millard (16/11/23)
- Net migration to the UK
The Migration Observatory, Madeleine Sumption, Ben Brindle and Peter William Walsh (27/5/26)
Questions
- Summarise the negative effects of Brexit on the UK economy.
- Why is it difficult to quantify these effects?
- How have UK firms attempted to reduce the costs of exporting to the EU?
- Why have goods exports been worse affected by Brexit than services exports?
- What difficulties would lie in the way of the UK negotiating a Turkish or Swiss model of trading relations with the EU?
- Have there been any economic benefits from Brexit and, if so, what?
For a while now, debate has raged over how to revive the fortunes of the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Since the 2008 financial crisis, the market has suffered a lack of investment, poor liquidity and low performance. This has produced a moribund financial market which has become unattractive to both investors and companies. Returns from the UK market lag international competitors, particularly the USA (see the chart).

Investment in the S&P 500 Index over the period would have produced annualised rates of return of 14.35%, more than double that from the FTSE 100 Index. Part of this underperformance is due to the industrial mix of the listed companies: low-growth energy and mining compared to the high-growth technology sectors in the USA. This has led to the perception that London is not a place for firms to list, particularly those in high-growth sectors.
In 2024, 88 companies choose to delist or transfer their primary listing elsewhere. Only 18 took their place. Several big companies from a range of industries, including Ashtead, Flutter and CRH have transferred their primary listing to New York or have plans to do so.
The new Labour government views stimulating higher levels of investment though the London market as an important element in its drive to boost productivity and growth in the UK. Recently, it has been reported that investment institutions have been lobbying the UK government to reduce significantly the tax-free allowance for Cash Individual Savings Accounts (ISAs) as a way to encourage more of UK households’ savings to be channelled through the UK stock market.
Currently, UK savers can save up to £20 000 annually into ISAs without paying tax on the interest earned. This can be held solely in Cash ISAs, or in a combination of Cash plus Stocks and Shares ISAs. The tax-free instruments which were introduced by a Labour government in 1999 to encourage higher savings have proved immensely popular. Data from Paragon Bank indicate that over £350 billion are held in these accounts. However, under the new proposals, the amount which would be allowed to be saved as cash has been rumoured to be cut to £4000 per year, with the hope that some of it will be invested in the UK stock market.
The proposals have proved controversial, with high-profile figures voicing opposition. In this blog, we’ll analyse the reasons behind the proposal and discuss whether it will have the desired effect of stimulating higher levels of investment. We’ll also discuss other proposed policies for making the LSE a more effective channel for investment flows to boost economic growth.
Stock markets and the saving and investment channel
The main reason for the proposed ISA change is to encourage more investment in the UK stock market. By reducing the amount which can be saved in Cash ISAs, the government hopes to encourage savers to invest in Stocks and Shares ISAs instead, particularly ones linked to the UK market. This would increase the amount of finance capital in the market, thereby boosting its liquidity. This would then make it an attractive place for young, vibrant UK and foreign companies to list.
An active, liquid secondary market in shares is important to attract firms to list on stock exchanges by issuing shares to outside investors. Traditionally, this channel has been important to the growth and development of firms.
Existing savings in Cash ISAs are deposited with financial institutions such as banks and building societies. Through the credit-creation process such funds can be used to finance productive investment. In countries like the UK, lending by financial institutions is an important way that investment is financed, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises. However, scale limits, regulatory restrictions and the need to diversify lending properly means that there are limits to the financing available for company investment through these institutions.
Capital markets like the LSE are intended to meet these larger-scale requirements. Financial claims, such as debt and equity, are divided into atomised instruments and sold to outside investors to fund investment and business growth.
Further, the desire for a capital injection to finance growth is not the only reason that firms seek stock market listings. Founders of companies may have a lot of wealth invested in the equity of their firms. Selling some of their equity to outside investors through a stock market listing is a way of diversifying their wealth. However, if they are to maximise the potential sale price, there must be an active, liquid secondary market to encourage investors to buy shares in the primary market.
Proponents of reform want to encourage a greater appetite for risk among UK investors, which will produce more savings being channelled through the LSE.
One issue is whether savers will respond in the way anticipated and channel more funds through the UK stock market. Many savers like the security of Cash ISAs. Such vehicles offer a low-risk/low-return combination, which savers like because the tax benefits boost returns. A survey by the Nottingham Building Society found that a substantial number of Cash ISA savers are concerned that the proposed changes could affect their ability to save for important financial goals, such as buying a house or building an emergency fund. Higher-risk Stocks and Shares ISAs are not suitable for such savings because of the potential to lose the initial amount invested. Many may not be prepared to do so and one-third suggested they would save less overall.
According to the survey, only 38% of Cash ISA holders said they would consider investing in Stocks and Shares ISAs if the Cash ISA allowance were reduced. It may be difficult to alter such risk-averse preferences given the average amount saved through ISAs and demographics. In 2022/23, the average amount subscribed to ISAs was £5000. This does not suggest that average households have a significant surplus of cash that they may want to investment at a high risk through the stock market. Indeed, many may want to have access to the cash at short notice and so are not prepared to forgo liquidity for the time needed to accrue the benefits of compounding which stock market investing produces.
Demographics may also play a role in this. Many of those who save more are now retired, or near retirement. They are less likely to see the appeal of compounding returns over long periods through investment in shares. Instead, with shorter investment horizons, they may only see the potential for losses associated with Stocks and Shares ISAs. Indeed, they will be starting to liquidate their long-term positions to draw income in retirement. Therefore, they may save less.
For others, who may be prepared to accept the additional risk, with the prospect of higher returns in the way that advocates of the reform hope for, the reduction in the Cash ISA allowance does not necessarily mean that they will invest in Stocks and Shares ISAs linked to the UK market. Since returns from the UK market have lagged international competitors, it may be that savers will channel their savings to those international markets, particularly in the USA, where the risk–return relationship has been more rewarding. Doing so has been made much easier and cheaper through a combination of economic forces including technological advances, regulatory changes and increased competition. This makes it much easier for UK savers to channel investment funds to wherever potential return is highest. At the moment, this is unlikely to be the UK, meaning that the anticipated boost to investment funds may not be as much as anticipated.
Critics of the proposal also question the motives of investment fund managers who have been lobbying government. They argue that the reforms will mean that many people who do now choose to save in Stocks and Shares ISAs will buy funds managed by fund managers who will receive fees for doing so. Critics argue that it is the prospect of higher fees which is the real motive behind the lobbying, not any desire to boost investment and growth.
What alternatives are available to boost the London Stock Exchange
The low valuations of LSE-listed companies compared to their international counterparts, particularly those in the USA, has discouraged growing firms from listing in London. To address this, there have been calls to enhance corporate governance standards and reduce regulatory burdens for listed companies.
This has already been recognised by the authorities. In 2024, UK regulators approved the biggest overhaul of rules regulating London-listed companies. The new listing rules will hand more power to company bosses to make decisions without shareholder votes. They will give companies more flexibility to adopt dual-class share structures used by founders and venture capital firms to give themselves stronger voting rights than other investors. This is particularly popular for founders who want to diversify their wealth without sacrificing control and is used frequently by tech companies and venture capitalists when listing in the USA. Such reforms may attract more companies in high-growth sectors to list in London.
Tax policies which provide the right incentives to buy and sell shares could also encourage more investment in the LSE. For instance, the repeal in the mid-1990s of the preferential tax treatment of dividend income for UK pension funds and insurance companies is seen as a major factor in discouraging those institutions from investing more funds in the London market. Since tax on capital gains is only liable when they are realised, this reduces their present value versus the equivalent amount on dividends.
As the following table illustrates, given the significantly higher percentage of total returns derived from dividends in the LSE compared to other exchanges, the equal tax treatment of dividend and capital gains provides an incentive to seek jurisdictions where capital gains predominate. This is what UK pension funds have done. Data from the Office of National Statistics show that in 2024, 77% of UK occupational pensions equity investments were overseas.

Reinstating this tax benefit could stimulate greater demand for UK equity from this significant sector, boosting liquidity in the London market. Allied to this are proposals from the UK government to consolidate the fragmented UK pension industry to achieve greater scale economies in that channel for investment. This can reduce financing costs, boosting the marginal return from UK investments for these funds, encouraging greater investment in the UK market (ceteris paribus).
Further, the 2.5% stamp duty on share purchases has been viewed as another disincentive for both retail and institutional investors to engage in security trading on the London Stock Exchange. The duty, which is much higher than in peer economies, effectively raises the expected rate of return on UK equites which depresses perceptions of their values and prices. Its removal may raise trading volumes, improving the liquidity of the market and be offset by increased tax revenues in the future. However, the Treasury suggests that the removal of stamp duty is doubtful, since it would create a significant hole in the UK government’s budget.
Ultimately, many of these reforms may have limited impact on investment. Efforts to boost confidence in the stock market will depend on improving the overall economic environment in the UK. Therefore, it will be the wider policies promoting growth in general which will increase the rates of return offered by London-listed firms and be more significant to attracting capital to London.
However, many of these are controversial themselves, such as relaxing laws around planning permissions and addressing business uncertainties around post-Brexit trading arrangements with the European Union. These broader economic measures could help make the UK generally, and the LSE specifically, more appealing to both domestic and international investors.
Conclusion
The UK government’s proposal to reduce the Cash ISA allowance is part of a broader strategy to boost investment in the stock market and stimulate economic growth. While this change could lead to more capital being directed towards productive investments, it also poses challenges for savers who like the security and simplicity of Cash ISAs.
The ultimate impact will depend on how savers respond to these changes. The potential reduction in overall savings rates could counteract some of the intended benefits. Further, the extent to which they are prepared to channel their savings into UK-listed companies will be important. If many seek higher returns elsewhere, the impact on the UK stock market may be limited. In any case, policies to address the problems of the UK stock market will only work if the wider issues associated with UK productivity and growth are addressed.
Articles
Data
Questions
- Explain how banks use cash ISAs to finance investment through credit creation.
- What do stock markets offer which may boost investment and economic growth?
- What are the issues with the London Stock Exchange which is making it unattractive for raising finance?
- How is the rumoured ISA reform intended to help address these issues?
- Analyse the extent to which it will do so.
- How might some of the broader reforms proposed by the UK government influence rate of return on UK equities and attract capital?
How would your life be without the internet? For many of you, this is a question that may be difficult to answer – as the internet has probably been an integral part of your life, probably since a very young age. We use internet infrastructure (broadband, 4G, 5G) to communicate, to shop, to educate ourselves, to keep in touch with each other, to buy and sell goods and services. We use it to seek and find new information, to learn how to cook, to download music, to watch movies. We also use the internet to make fast payments, transfer money between accounts, manage our ISA or our pension fund, set up direct debits and pay our credit-card bills.
I could spend hours writing about all the things that we do over the internet these days, and I would probably never manage to come up with a complete list. Just think about how many hours you spend online every day. Most likely, much of your waking time is spent using internet-based services one way or another (including apps on your phone, streaming on your phone, tablet or your smart TV and similar). If your access to the internet was disrupted, you would certainly feel the difference. What if you just couldn’t afford to have computer or internet access? What effect would that have on your education, your ability to find a job, and your income?
Martin Jenkins, a former homeless man, now entrepreneur, thinks that the magnitude of this effect is rather significant. In fact, he is so convinced about the importance of bringing the internet to poorer households, that he recently founded a company, Neptune, offering low-income households in the Bronx district of New York free access to online education, healthcare and finance portals. His venture was mentioned in a recent (and very interesting) BBC article – a link to which can be found at the end of this blog. But is internet connectivity really that important when it comes to economic and labour market outcomes? And is there a systematic link between economic growth and internet penetration rates?
These are all questions that have been the subject of intensive debate over the last few years, in the context of both developed and developing economies. Indeed, the ‘digital divide’ as it is known (the economic gap between the internet haves and have nots) is not something that concerns only developing countries. According to a recent policy brief published by the New York City Comptroller:
More than one-third (34 percent) of households in the Bronx lack broadband at home, compared to 30 percent in Brooklyn, 26 percent in Queens, 22 percent in Staten Island, and 21 percent in Manhattan.
The report goes on to present data on the percentage of households with internet connection at home by NYC district, and it does not take advanced econometric skills for one to notice that there is a clear link between median district income and broadband access. Wealthier districts (e.g. Manhattan Community District 1 & 2 – Battery Park City, Greenwich Village & Soho PUMA), tend to have a significantly higher share of households with broadband access, than less affluent ones (e.g. NYC-Brooklyn Community District 13 – Brighton Beach & Coney Island PUMA) – 88% of total households compared with 58%.
But, do these large variations in internet connectivity matter? The evidence is mixed. On the one hand, there are several studies that find a clear, strong link between internet penetration and economic growth. Czernich et al (2011), for instance, using data on OECD countries over the period 1996–2007, find that “a 10 percentage point increase in broadband penetration raised annual per capita growth by 0.9–1.5 percentage points”.
Another study by Koutroumpis (2018) examined the effect of rolling out broadband in the UK.
For the UK, the speed increase contributed 1.71% to GDP in total and 0.12% annually. Combining the effect of the adoption and speed changes increased UK GDP by 6.99% cumulatively and 0.49% annually on average”. (pp.10–11)
The evidence is less clear, however, when one tries to estimate the benefits between different types of workers – low and high skilled. In a recent paper, Atasoy (2013) finds that:
gaining access to broadband services in a county is associated with approximately a 1.8 percentage point increase in the employment rate, with larger effects in rural and isolated areas.
But then he adds:
most of the employment gains result from existing firms increasing the scale of their labor demand and from growth in the labor force. These results are consistent with a theoretical model in which broadband technology is complementary to skilled workers, with larger effects among college-educated workers and in industries and occupations that employ more college-educated workers.
Similarly, Forman et al (2009) analyse the effect of business use of advanced internet technology and local variation in US wage growth, over the period 1995–2000. Their findings show that:
Advanced internet technology is associated with larger wage growth in places that were already well off. These are places with highly educated and large urban populations, and concentration of IT-intensive industry. Overall, advanced internet explains over half of the difference in wage growth between these counties and all others.
How important then is internet access as a determinant of growth and economic activity and what role does it have in bridging economic disparities between communities? The answer to this question is most likely ‘very important’ – but less straightforward than one might have assumed.
Article
References
- Comptroller, New York City, Internet Inequality
- Czernich, N., Falck, O., Kretschmer, T. and Woessmann, L., 2011, Broadband infrastructure and economic growth, The Economic Journal, 121(552), pp.505–32
- Koutroumpis, P., 2018, The economic impact of broadband: evidence from OECD countries, Ofcom
- Atasoy, H., 2013, The effects of broadband internet expansion on labor market outcomes, ILR Review, 66(2), pp.315–45
- Forman, C., Goldfarb, A. and Greenstein, S., 2009, The Internet and Local Wages: Convergence or Divergence? (No. w14750), National Bureau of Economic Research
Questions
- Is there a link between economic growth and internet access? Discuss, using examples.
- Explain the arguments for and against government intervention to subsidise internet access of poorer households.
- How important is the internet to you and your day to day life? Take a day offline (yes, really – a whole day). Then come back and write about it.
The IMF has just published its six-monthly World Economic Outlook. This provides an assessment of trends in the global economy and gives forecasts for a range of macroeconomic indicators by country, by groups of countries and for the whole world.
This latest report is upbeat for the short term. Global economic growth is expected to be around 3.9% this year and next. This represents 2.3% this year and 2.5% next for advanced countries and 4.8% this year and 4.9% next for emerging and developing countries. For large advanced countries such rates are above potential economic growth rates of around 1.6% and thus represent a rise in the positive output gap or fall in the negative one.
But while the near future for economic growth seems positive, the IMF is less optimistic beyond that for advanced countries, where growth rates are forecast to decline to 2.2% in 2019, 1.7% in 2020 and 1.5% by 2023. Emerging and developing countries, however, are expected to see growth rates of around 5% being maintained.
For most countries, current favorable growth rates will not last. Policymakers should seize this opportunity to bolster growth, make it more durable, and equip their governments better to counter the next downturn.
By comparison with other countries, the UK’s growth prospects look poor. The IMF forecasts that its growth rate will slow from 1.8% in 2017 to 1.6% in 2018 and 1.5% in 2019, eventually rising to around 1.6% by 2023.
The short-term figures are lower than in the USA, France and Germany and reflect ‘the anticipated higher barriers to trade and lower foreign direct investment following Brexit’.
The report sounds some alarm bells for the global economy.
The first is a possible growth in trade barriers as a trade war looms between the USA and China and as Russia faces growing trade sanctions. As Christine Lagarde, managing director of the IMF told an audience in Hong Kong:
Governments need to steer clear of protectionism in all its forms. …Remember: the multilateral trade system has transformed our world over the past generation. It helped reduce by half the proportion of the global population living in extreme poverty. It has reduced the cost of living, and has created millions of new jobs with higher wages. …But that system of rules and shared responsibility is now in danger of being torn apart. This would be an inexcusable, collective policy failure. So let us redouble our efforts to reduce trade barriers and resolve disagreements without using exceptional measures.
The second danger is a growth in world government and private debt levels, which at 225% of global GDP are now higher than before the financial crisis of 2007–9. With Trump’s policies of tax cuts and increased government expenditure, the resulting rise in US government debt levels could see some fiscal tightening ahead, which could act as a brake on the world economy. As Maurice Obstfeld , Economic Counsellor and Director of the Research Department, said at the Press Conference launching the latest World Economic Outlook:
Debts throughout the world are very high, and a lot of debts are denominated in dollars. And if dollar funding costs rise, this could be a strain on countries’ sovereign financial institutions.
In China, there has been a massive rise in corporate debt, which may become unsustainable if the Chinese economy slows. Other countries too have seen a surge in private-sector debt. If optimism is replaced by pessimism, there could be a ‘Minsky moment’, where people start to claw down on debt and banks become less generous in lending. This could lead to another crisis and a global recession. A trigger could be rising interest rates, with people finding it hard to service their debts and so cut down on spending.
The third danger is the slow growth in labour productivity combined with aging populations in developed countries. This acts as a brake on growth. The rise in AI and robotics (see the post Rage against the machine) could help to increase potential growth rates, but this could cost jobs in the short term and the benefits could be very unevenly distributed.
This brings us to a final issue and this is the long-term trend to greater inequality, especially in developed economies. Growth has been skewed to the top end of the income distribution. As the April 2017 WEO reported, “technological advances have contributed the most to the recent rise in inequality, but increased financial globalization – and foreign direct investment in particular – has also played a role.”
And the policy of quantitative easing has also tended to benefit the rich, as its main effect has been to push up asset prices, such as share and house prices. Although this has indirectly stimulated the economy, it has mainly benefited asset owners, many of whom have seen their wealth soar. People further down the income scale have seen little or no growth in their real incomes since the financial crisis.
Articles
- Clouds gather over global economy, casting long shadow on Europe
Politico, Pierre Briançon (18/4/18)
- IMF warns rising trade tensions threaten to derail global growth
Reuters, David Lawder (17/4/18)
- IMF outlook contains cause for celebration but a horrendous hangover is looming
The Guardian, Greg Jericho (18/4/18)
- World trade system in danger of being torn apart, warns IMF
The Guardian, Larry Elliott (17/4/18)
- IMF Warns of Rising Threats to Global Financial System
Bloomberg, Andrew Mayeda (18/4/18)
- IMF issues warning on global debt
BBC News, Andrew Walker (18/4/18)
- The IMF has a simple message: the global recovery will peter out
The Guardian, Larry Elliott (17/4/18)
- Global growth is built, alas, on shaky foundations
The Irish Times, Martin Wolf (18/4/18)
- Government debt
The Economist (19/4/18)
- This Is How Much Money the World Owes
Fortune (19/4/18)
Report
Data
Questions
- For what reasons may the IMF forecasts turn out to be incorrect?
- Why are emerging and developing countries likely to experience faster rates of economic growth than advanced countries?
- What are meant by a ‘positive output gap’ and a ‘negative output gap’? What are the consequences of each for various macroeconomic indicators?
- Explain what is meant by a ‘Minsky moment’. When are such moments likely to occur? Explain why or why not such a moment is likely to occur in the next two or three years?
- For every debt owed, someone is owed that debt. So does it matter if global public and/or private debts rise? Explain.
- What have been the positive and negative effects of the policy of quantitative easing?
- What are the arguments for and against using tariffs and other forms of trade restrictions as a means of boosting a country’s domestic economy?
We all know that our spending changes during the Christmas period: namely we spend a lot more than during the rest of the year. This applies across the board – we buy more clothes, food and drink, even though each day, we can generally only wear, eat and drink the same amount as usual! This has some interesting points from a behavioural economics stance, but here I’m going to think about the impact of this on some key retailers.
Marks & Spencer have previously made headlines for the wrong reasons: poor sales on clothes and the need for serious restructuring of its stores, target audience and marketing in order for this long-standing retailer to remain current and competitive. Although sales were expected to rise in the Christmas period, they did significantly better than expected, with sales growth of 2.3%, above the expected 0.5%. More encouragingly, this growth was not just in food, but in clothing and homeware as well.
One of the key reasons given for this above-expected improvement in sales was the conveniently timed Christmas, falling on a Sunday and hence giving extra shopping days. M&S have said that this certainly helped with their Christmas trading. Although this was good for Q4 trading, the timing will not play ball for Easter and they are expecting a negative effective during that trading period. Some analysts have said that despite the growth being boosted by the timing of Christmas, there were still signs of a change in fortunes. Bryan Roberts from TCC Global said:

“It might be the sign of some green shoots in that part of the business.”
This is consistent with the Chief Executive, Steve Rowe’s comments that despite the timing of Christmas adding around 1.5% to clothing and home sales growth, the recovery was also due to “better ranges, better availability and better prices”.
It appears as though many other retailers have experienced positive growth in Christmas sales, with the John Lewis Partnership seeing like-for-like sales growth of 2.7%, with Waitrose at a 2.8% rise.
The other interesting area is supermarkets. Waitrose and M&S are certainly competitors in the food industry, but at the higher end. If we consider the mid-range supermarkets (Asda, Morrisons, Sainsbury’s and Tesco), they have also performed, as a whole, fairly well. The low-cost Aldi and Lidl have been causing havoc for these supermarket chains, but the Christmas period seemed to prove fruitful for them.
Tesco saw UK like-for-like sales up by 1.8%, which showed significant progress in light of previously difficult trading periods with the emergence of the low-cost chains. Q$ was its better quarter of sales growth for over five years. One of the key drivers of this growth is fresh food sales and its Chief Executive, Dave Lewis said “we are very encouraged by the sustained strong progress that we are making across the group.” However, despite these positive numbers, Tesco only really met market expectation, rather than surpassing them as Morrison, Sainsbury’s and Marks & Spencer did.
Perhaps the stand-out performance came from Morrisons, with its best Christmas performance for seven years. Another casualty of the low-cost competitors, it has been making a recovery and Q4 of 2016 demonstrated this beyond doubt. Like-for-like sales for the nine weeks to the start of 2017 were up by 2.9%, with growth in both food and drink and clothing.
Morrisons has been on a long and painful journey, with significant reorganisation of its stores and management. While this has created problems, it does appear to be working.
We also saw a general move up to the more premium own-brands and this again benefited all supermarkets. Morrisons Chief Executive, David Potts said:
“We are delighted to have found our mojo … Every year does bring its challenges, but so far we haven’t seen any change in consumer sentiment. Customers splashed out over Christmas and wanted to trade up … We are becoming more relevant to more people as we turn the company around.”
So it seems to be success all round for traders over the Christmas period and that, in many cases, this has been a reversal of fortunes. The question now is whether or not this will continue with the uncertainty over Brexit and the economy.
Articles
M&S beats Christmas sales forecast in clothing and homeware BBC News (12/1/17)
Marks & Spencer reports long-awaited rise in clothing sales The Telegraph, Ashley Armstrong (12/1/17)
Marks and Spencer reveals signs of growth in clothing business Financial Times, Mark Vandevelde (12/1/17)
Tesco’s festive sales lifted by fresh food The Telegraph, Ashley Armstrong (12/01/17)
Tesco caps year of recovery with solid Christmas Reuters, James Davey and Kate Holton (12/1/17)
Tesco, Marks & Spencer, Debenhams, John Lewis and co cheer strong Christmas trading Independent, Josie Cox and Zlata Rodionova (12/1/17)
Morrisons sees best Christmas performance for seven years BBC News (10/12/17)
Morrisons enjoys some ‘remarkable’ Christmas cheer’ The Guardian, Sarah butler and Angela Monaghan (10/1/17)
Record Christmas as Sainsbury’s ‘shows logic of Argos takeover’ The Guardian, Sarah Butler and Angela Monaghan (11/1/17)
Questions
- Why have the big four in the supermarket industry been under pressure over the past 2 years in terms of their sales, profits and market share?
- How have the changes that have been made by M&S’ Chief Executive helped to boost sales once more?
- Share prices for supermarkets have risen. Illustrate why this is on a demand and supply diagram. Why has Tesco, despite its performance, seen a fall in its share price?
- What are the key factors behind Morrison’s success?
- What type of market structure is the supermarket industry? Does this help to explain why the big four have faced so many challenges in recent times?
- If there has been a general increase in sales across all stores over the Christmas trading period, that goes beyond expectations, can we infer anything about customer tastes and their expectations about the future?