Category: Economics for Business: Ch 25

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Brexit 10 years on: the economic impacts

It is 10 years since the Brexit referendum. From an electorate of 46,501,251 people, 17,410,742 (37.4%) voted to leave, 16,141,241 (34.7%) voted to remain and 12,949,258 (27.8%) did not vote. The UK left the EU on 31 January 2020 at 11:00 pm, but remained in the single market and customs union during a transition period lasting for a further 11 months until December 31 2020.

To mark the 10th anniversary of the vote a number of articles have been written assessing the effects of Brexit. Here we look at the economic effects, as do the articles linked below. This blog updates the analysis of an earlier one, The costs of Brexit: a clearer picture.

Trade

After the referendum, extensive negotiations took place on the trading arrangements between the UK and EU that would exist once Brexit was finalised.

One possibility was ‘The Norwegian model’, which would have seen the UK join the European Economic Area (EEA), giving it access to the single market, but removing regulation in some key areas, such as fisheries and home affairs. This was ruled out in favour of a bilateral trade agreement. Three main types were available:

  • Swiss model, where the UK would negotiate a series of bilateral agreements with the EU, including selective or general access to the single market.
  • Canadian model, where the UK would form a comprehensive trade agreement with the EU to lower customs tariffs and other barriers to trade.
  • Turkish model, where the UK would form a customs union with the EU. In Turkey’s case the agreement relates principally to manufactured goods.

The agreement reached, the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) was a version of the Canadian model. The UK would leave the single market and customs union, but there would be tariff-free and quota-free trade in goods between the UK and the EU. However, to ensure that it was EU and UK business that would benefit from these ‘trade preferences’, businesses must show that their products fulfil ‘rules of origin’ requirements.

Rules of origin. Under rules of origin requirements, when a good is imported into the UK from outside the EU and then has value added to it by processing, packaging, cleaning, remixing, preserving, refashioning, etc., it can only count as a UK good if sufficient value or weight is added. The proportions vary by product, but generally goods must have approximately 50% UK content (or 80% of the weight of foodstuffs) to qualify for tariff-free access to the EU. For example, in the case of a petrol car, 55% of its value must have been created in either the EU or UK.

Meeting rules of origin has created a large amount of paperwork for businesses and this has created a significant barrier to trade. What is more, exporters are required to complete import/export declarations. Also, agri-food goods are subject to strict physical border controls. These barriers have increased the costs of trade and reduced its volume.

Services. Free trade in services is not provided by the TCA. Instead, services exporters face various barriers, such as certain professional qualifications no longer being recognised in EU countries and a loss of ‘passporting’ rights that previously allowed cross-border financial operations with minimal extra permissions.

Brexit impact. Despite new barriers to trade in services, they are generally less significant than the barriers for trade in goods, particularly in a digital age. Indeed, UK services exports have held up well. Although they fell in 2020, they have grown significantly since. According to House of Commons Library Statistics on UK-EU trade (see link below):

In 2025, UK exports of services to the EU were 28% above their 2019 level in real terms. Exports to non-EU countries were 26% above their 2019 level.

UK exports of goods to the EU, however, have fared less well. In 2025 they were 14% below their 2019 level in real terms. This is partly the effect of COVID and the Ukraine war, but exports to non-EU countries were only 8% lower than 2019. According to research by economists John Springford and Anton Spisak for the Centre for European Reform (see link below), Brexit has depressed UK goods exports to the EU by 16%. According to the Office for Budget Responsibility, (see link below) both exports and imports in the long run will be around 15% lower than they would have been if the UK had remained in the EU. What is more, the growth of goods trade (exports plus imports) has fallen well behind the average of the rest of the G7. And according to British Chambers of Commerce research (see link below), 54% of UK exporters think the TCA is making it harder to export and the need for change is urgent.

The new barriers reduce market access, while lower export volumes reduce competition and economies of scale. There is less competition too from imports, with many EU firms no longer exporting to the UK because of the costs. The barriers lead to a misallocation of resources, with highly productive UK firms exporting less, with less productive firms in the UK and EU focusing purely on their domestic markets. The barriers thus impose an impediment to the exploitation of comparative advantage

Investment

Both domestic and foreign direct investment (FDI) in the UK have been adversely affected by Brexit. Bloom et al., in their paper for the NBER (see link below), estimate that by 2025, investment was 12–18% lower than it would have been without Brexit.

In the early years after the referendum, lower capital investment was mainly the result of uncertainty and devoting significant resources to administrative Brexit preparations. Later it was largely the result of the trade barriers themselves. Not surprisingly, firms in the UK with high exposure to EU markets experienced a sharper decline in investment than less-exposed ones.

The end of the single market and customs union reduced the attractiveness of the UK as a hub for FDI relative to competitor countries. And UK firms were encouraged to invest in the EU to create hubs for selling within the EU, thereby allowing them to avoid the trade barriers.

According to the Bloom et al. analysis, the effect of lower investment and less competition has been a fall in UK productivity of around 3% to 4% compared to remaining in the EU. The Office For Budget Responsibility argues that the post-Brexit trading relationship will reduce long-run productivity by 4% relative to remaining in the EU.

Growth in GDP

Lower investment, lower productivity and trade barriers have had a negative impact on economic growth. According to analysis by the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) (see link below), by the end of 2023, UK real GDP was some 2–3% lower solely as a result of Brexit – in other words, after having taken into account the effects of COVID-19 and the Russia-Ukraine war. This corresponds to a per capita income loss of approximately £850. The NIESR analysis predicts that this will rise to some 5–6% of GDP, or about £2,300 per capita, by 2035.

Bank of England data, based on surveys of chief financial officers of over 2000 firms (small, medium and large), suggest that the UK economy is some 6% smaller than it would have been without Brexit. The Office for Budget Responsibility estimates that Brexit has caused a long-run reduction in GDP of 4% as a result of a similar percentage reduction in productivity.

The growth of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) has been disproportionately dampened by the compliance costs of trade with the EU. Some SMEs, especially in the food and drink sector, have ceased exporting to the EU altogether.

Labour supply and migration

Halting the right of EU workers to move freely to the UK for work created acute labour shortages in specific sectors such as hospitality, health and social care, logistics, construction and agriculture. However, while immigration from the EU fell dramatically, this was more than offset by increased immigration from non-EU countries. But this was unable to fill shortfalls in some sectors.

The loss of free movement of labour means that UK workers now face restrictions on working in the EU. These include obtaining a work visa, which requires a formal job offer, sponsorship and meeting strict salary thresholds. While business trips for meetings, conferences, trade fairs, etc. are generally exempt, if the work involves remuneration, then normally a work visa will be required. The terms of work visas vary between member states. This has created a considerable barrier for touring bands and other artists. Short-term self-employed or freelance work is highly restricted, with virtually no work permit options available for visiting UK nationals.

Because employing UK nationals now imposes extra administrative and time-consuming burdens on local EU employers, many now prioritize applicants from EU nations who can start immediately.

Articles

Videos

Reports, Research, Analysis and Data

Questions

  1. Summarise the negative effects of Brexit on the UK economy.
  2. Why is it difficult to quantify these effects?
  3. How have UK firms attempted to reduce the costs of exporting to the EU?
  4. Why have goods exports been worse affected by Brexit than services exports?
  5. What difficulties would lie in the way of the UK negotiating a Turkish or Swiss model of trading relations with the EU?
  6. Have there been any economic benefits from Brexit and, if so, what?
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Who pays Trump’s tariffs?

Three recent reports (see links below) have suggested that US consumers and businesses pay most of the tariffs imposed by the second Trump administration. The percentage varies from around 86% to 96%. US customs revenue surged by approximately $200 billion in 2025, but this was a tax paid almost entirely by US consumers and businesses. Foreign suppliers largely maintained their (pre-tariff) prices. They took a hit in terms of reduced volumes rather than reduced pre-tariff prices.

The incidence of a tariff between consumers, domestic importers and overseas producers will depend on price elasticities of demand and supply. The following diagram shows a product where the importing country is large enough to have a degree of market power, which will normally be the case with the USA. The greater its buying power, the flatter will be its demand curve, showing that the foreign supplier will have little influence on the price. With no tariff, the equilibrium price paid by importers will be at point a, where demand equals supply. Q1 would be imported at a price of P1.

Imposition of a tariff will shift the supply curve upwards by the amount of the tariff. The new equilibrium price paid by importers will be at point b, where the new supply curve crosses the demand curve. Importers thus now pay a post-tariff price of P2: an effective rise in price of P2 minus P1. Foreign exporters receive P3, which is what they are paid by importers after the tariff has been paid.

The consumer price will be above P2 as that includes a mark-up by US businesses on top of the price they pay to import the product. Importers may bear some of the increase in price and not pass the full amount onto consumers, depending on competition and their ability to absorb cost increases.

President Trump argued that there would be very little rise in price from the tariffs and that overseas suppliers would bear the brunt of the tariffs. Indeed, recently he has argued that this must be the case as US inflation has been falling. In response, critics maintain that the rate of inflation would have fallen more without the tariffs and that current prices would be lower than they are. Also, if US importing firms or retailers bear some of the increased cost, even though this helps to dampen the price rise, their lower profits could damage investment and employment.

The Reports

The first report is from the New York Fed (one of the regional branches of the Federal Reserve Bank). It examines the effect of tariffs imposed in 2025, over three periods: (i) January to August, (ii) September to October, and (iii) November. In the first period, 94% of the tariffs were paid by US importers and 6% by foreign exports; in the second period, the figures were 92% and 8% and in the third period, 86% and 14%.

The second report is The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2026 to 2036 from the Congressional Budget Office. Box 2-1 notes that, as of November 2025, ‘the effective tariff rate was about 13 percentage points higher than the roughly 2 percent rate on imports in 2024’. Its analysis suggests that 95% of the tariffs will be borne by importers. Of these higher import prices, 30% will be borne by US businesses, largely through reduced profit margins, and 70% by consumers through higher prices. This will also allow many businesses which produce goods that compete with foreign imports to ‘increase their prices because of the decline in competition from abroad and the increased demand for tariff-free domestic goods’.

The third report is from the Kiel Insitut. In its Policy Brief, Americaʼs Own Goal: Who Pays the Tariffs?, it finds that US importers and consumers bear 96% of the cost of the 2025 tariffs, with foreign exporters absorbing only about 4%. It bases it findings on shipment-level data covering over 25 million transactions valued at nearly $4 trillion. This also shows that exports to the USA declined as foreign exporters preferred to reduce volumes rather than absorbing the tariffs.

The tariffs raised some $200 billion in 2025, around 3.8% of Federal tax receipts. But, as we have seen, this was paid largely by US consumers and business. It goes some way to offsetting the annual cut in tax revenues of around $450 to $520 billion per year from the tax cuts, largely to the better off, in Trump’s ‘One Big Beautiful Bill’.

Reports

Aricles

Questions

  1. Summarise the findings of the three reports (but just Box 2-1 of the Congressional Budget Office one).
  2. Assess the argument that protectionism leads to inefficiency in the protected industries.
  3. Under what circumstances would exporters to the USA absorb a high percentage of tariff increases? Consider questions of elasticity.
  4. Can tariffs ever be justified on efficiency grounds?
  5. Can tariffs be justified as a bargaining ploy? Can they be used as a means of achieving freer and fairer trade?
  6. Read the blog, President Reagan on tariffs and summarise President Reagan’s arguments. Are they still relevant today?
  7. Consider the arguments for and against the EU raising tariffs on US goods.
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Rising global uncertainty and its effects

In a blog in October 2024, we looked at global uncertainty and how it can be captured in a World Uncertainty Index. The blog stated that ‘We continue to live through incredibly turbulent times. In the past decade or so we have experienced a global financial crisis, a global health emergency, seen the UK’s departure from the European Union, and witnessed increasing levels of geopolitical tension and conflict’.

Since then, Donald Trump has been elected for a second term and has introduced sweeping tariffs. What is more, the tariffs announced on so-called ‘Liberation Day‘ have not remained fixed, but have fluctuated with negotiations and threatened retaliation. The resulting uncertainty makes it very hard for businesses to plan and many have been unwilling to commit to investment decisions. The uncertainty has been compounded by geopolitical events, such as the continuing war in Ukraine, the war in Gaza and the June 13 Israeli attack on Iran.

The World Uncertainty Index (WUI) tracks uncertainty around the world by applying a form of text mining known as ‘term frequency’ to the country reports produced by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). The words searched for are ‘uncertain’, ‘uncertainty’ and ‘uncertainties’ and the number of times they occur as percentage of the total words is recorded. To produce the WUI this figure is then multiplied by 1m. A higher WUI number indicates a greater level of uncertainty.

The monthly global average WUI is shown in Chart 1 (click here for a PowerPoint). It is based on 71 countries. Since 2008 the WUI has averaged a little over 23 000: i.e. 2.3 per cent of the text in EIU reports contains the word ‘uncertainty’ or a close variant. In May 2025, it was almost 79 000 – the highest since the index was first complied in 2008. The previous highest was in March 2020, at the start of the COVID-19 outbreak, when the index rose to just over 56 000.

The second chart shows the World Trade Uncertainty Index (WTUI), published on the same site as the WUI (click here for a PowerPoint). The method adopted in its construction therefore mirrors that for the WUI but counts the number of times in EIU country reports ‘uncertainty’ is mentioned within proximity to a word related to trade, such as ‘protectionism’, ‘NAFTA’, ‘tariff’, ‘trade’, ‘UNCTAD’ or ‘WTO.’

The chart shows that in May 2025, the WTUI had risen to just over 23 000 – the second highest since December 2019, when President Trump imposed a new round of tariffs on Chinese imports and announced that he would restore steel tariffs on Brazil and Argentina. Since 2008, the WTUI has averaged just 2228.

It remains to be seen whether more stability in trade relations and geopolitics will allow WUI and WUTI to decline once more, or whether greater instability will simply lead to greater uncertainty, with damaging consequences for investment and also for consumption and employment.

Articles

Uncertainty Indices

Questions

  1. Explain what is meant by ‘text mining’. What are its strengths and weaknesses in assessing business, consumer and trade uncertainty?
  2. Explain how the UK Monthly EPU Index is derived.
  3. Why has uncertainty increased so dramatically since the start of 2025?
  4. Compare indices based on text mining with confidence indices.
  5. Plot consumer and business/industry confidence indicators for the past 24 months, using EC data. Do they correspond with the WUI?
  6. How may uncertainty affect consumers’ decisions?
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New UK trade deals

The UK signed three trade deals in May – one with the USA, one with India and one with the EU. It is hoped by the government that these trade deals will provide a welcome boost to the UK economy.

The deal with the USA reduced tariffs on UK car exports to the USA from 27.5% to 10%, and on steel and aluminium exports from 25% to 0%. Pharmaceutical exports would also get more favourable treatment and there would be ‘reciprocal market access on beef’ (but with no lowering of food standards). Nevertheless, President Trump’s baseline tariff of 10% on most goods remains, as with other countries. However, a ruling by the US Court of International Trade has found that the Trump’s use of emergency powers to justify the sweeping use of tariffs is wrong. The Trump administration is appealing against the ruling and until the appeal is heard, the tariffs have been reinstated. Also, on May 30, the Trump administration announced that tariffs on steel and aluminium imports would rise from 25% to 50%. It remained to be seen whether this would affect the deal to reduce the rate to zero for British steel and aluminium imports.

The deal with India involves a reduction in tariffs on UK exports – some to zero – and simplified trade rules, faster customs clearance, less paperwork and the freedom for UK businesses to provide telecommunications and construction services. In return, tariffs will be reduced to zero on 99% of Indian exports to the UK. The UK government estimates that deal will result in trade between the two countries increasing by over 30%, with the UK’s GDP expanding by around 0.1 percentage points per year.

UK-EU trade

Perhaps the most significant new trade deal, however, is with the EU. This is a major advance on the current post-Brexit Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA). Under the TCA, there are no tariffs or quotas on UK goods exports to the EU or EU goods exports to the UK. However, to ensure that it is EU and UK business that benefits from these ‘trade preferences’, firms must show that their products fulfil ‘rules of origin’ requirements.

Under rules of origin requirements, when a good is imported into the UK from outside the EU and then has value added to it by processing, packaging, cleaning, remixing, preserving, refashioning, etc., it can only count as a UK good if sufficient value or weight is added. The proportions vary by product, but generally goods must have approximately 50 per cent UK content (or 80 per cent of the weight of foodstuffs) to qualify for tariff-free access to the EU. As a result, many goods exported to the EU with a proportion of imported components face tariffs.

Also, the TCA does not include free trade in services. The UK is a major exporter of services, including legal, financial, accounting, IT and engineering. It has a positive trade in services balance with the EU, unlike its negative trade in goods balance. Although some of the barriers which apply to other non-EU countries have been reduced for the UK in the TCA, UK service providers still face barriers which impose costs. For example, some EU countries limit the time that businesspeople providing services can stay in their countries to six months in any twelve. Also, since Brexit, UK artists and musicians have faced restrictions when touring and working in the EU. They can only work up to 90 out of every 180 days. This causes problems for longer tours and for musicians and crew who work in multiple bands or orchestras.

Perhaps the greatest barrier to trade under the TCA has been the large range of non-tariff measures (NTMs), such as customs checks, rules-of-origin and other paperwork, meeting various regulations and standards, and sanitary and phytosanitary checks on foodstuffs, plants and animals. Both the OBR and the Bank of England estimate that these post-Brexit trade restrictions are reducing UK GDP by around 4% and will continue to do so unless trade with the EU becomes freer.

The new UK-EU trade deal

The deal struck in mid-May reduces many of the administrative barriers to trade. Perhaps the most significant are the border checks on food, animal and plant shipments to and from the EU. Many of these checks will be scrapped. The new sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) agreement allows many UK food products to be exported that previously were banned or proved too administratively costly. To achieve this free movement, the UK will generally follow EU standards, or similar standards so as to avoids harming EU trade. UK food exporters have generally welcomed the deal.

British steel exports to the EU will be protected from new EU rules and tariffs. This should save UK steel some £25m per year. Also, the EU has agreed to recognise UK carbon emissions caps, meaning that UK exports to the EU will avoid around £800m of carbon border taxes.

The post-Brexit fishing deal between the UK and EU, which saw a reduction of 25% in EU fishing quotas in UK waters, will be extended for another 12 years. Many UK fishers, however, had hoped for scrapping EU access to UK waters. The deal also allows various sea foods, including certain shellfish, to be exported to the EU for the first time since Brexit.

Other elements of the deal include a new security and defence partnership, the use of e-gates for UK travellers to the EU and an agreement to work towards a young person’s mobility scheme, allowing young people from the UK/EU to work and travel freely in the EU/UK again for a period of time.

The elements of the deal concerned with trade represent freer trade, but not totally free trade. The UK is not rejoining the customs union or single market. Nevertheless, strong supporters of Brexit have criticised the deal as a movement towards greater alignment of standards and thus a dilution of UK sovereignty. Supporters of greater alignment, on the other hand, argue that the deal does not go far enough and that even freer trade and less red tape would bring greater benefits to the UK.

Articles

UK-US trade deal

UK-India trade deal

UK-EU trade deal

Questions

  1. Outline the main elements of (a) the UK-US trade deal, (b) the UK-India trade deal and (c) the UK-EU trade deal. How much is it claimed that each deal will add to UK GDP?
  2. What trade barriers remain in each of the three deals?
  3. What elements are missing from the UK-EU trade deal that campaigners have been pushing for?
  4. Under what circumstances do free trade deals lead to (a) trade creation; (b) trade diversion?
  5. Would you expect the UK-EU trade deal on balance to lead to trade creation or trade diversion? Explain why.
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President Reagan on tariffs

In a 1987 address to the US nation, Republican President Ronald Reagan discussed the question of tariffs. His message was clear.

You see, at first, when someone says, ‘Let’s impose tariffs on foreign imports,’ it looks like they’re doing the patriotic thing by protecting American products and jobs. And sometimes for a short while it works – but only for a short time. What eventually occurs is:

First, homegrown industries start relying on government protection in the form of high tariffs. They stop competing and stop making the innovative management and technological changes they need to succeed in world markets.
 
And then, while all this is going on, something even worse occurs: high tariffs inevitably lead to retaliation by foreign countries and the triggering of fierce trade wars. The result is more and more tariffs, higher and higher trade barriers, and less and less competition. So, soon, because of the prices made artificially high by tariffs that subsidise inefficiency and poor management, people stop buying.
 
Then the worst happens: markets shrink and collapse; businesses and industries shut down; and millions of people lose their jobs.
 
The memory of all this occurring back in the thirties made me determined when I came to Washington to spare the American people the protectionist legislation that destroys prosperity.
 
Now, it hasn’t always been easy. There are those in this Congress, just as there were back in the ’30s, who want to go for the quick political advantage, who will risk America’s prosperity for the sake of a short-term appeal to some special interest group, who forget that more than five million American jobs are directly tied to the foreign export business and additional millions are tied to imports.
 
For those of us who lived through the Great Depression, the memory of the suffering it caused is deep and searing. And today, many economic analysts and historians argue that high tariff legislation, passed back in that period called the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, greatly deepened the Depression and prevented economic recovery.

He returned to the topic of tariffs in November 1988, when he reflected on the benefits of free and fair trade and the dangers of protectionism.

Here in America, as we reflect on the many things we have to be grateful for, we should take a moment to recognize that one of the key factors behind our nation’s great prosperity is the open trade policy that allows the American people to freely exchange goods and services with free people around the world. The freedom to trade is not a new issue for America.

In 1776 our Founding Fathers signed the Declaration of Independence, charging the British with a number of offenses, among them, and I quote, ‘cutting off our trade with all parts of the world’.
 
And that same year, a Scottish economist named Adam Smith launched another revolution with a book entitled ‘The Wealth of Nations’, which exposed for all time the folly of protectionism. Over the past 200 years, not only has the argument against tariffs and trade barriers won nearly universal agreement among economists but it has also proven itself in the real world, where we have seen free-trading nations prosper while protectionist countries fall behind.
 
America’s most recent experiment with protectionism was a disaster for the working men and women of this country. When Congress passed the Smoot-Hawley tariff in 1930, we were told that it would protect America from foreign competition and save jobs in this country – the same line we hear today. The actual result was the Great Depression, the worst economic catastrophe in our history; one out of four Americans were thrown out of work. Two years later, when I cast my first ballot for President, I voted for Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who opposed protectionism and called for the repeal of that disastrous tariff.
 
Ever since that time, the American people have stayed true to our heritage by rejecting the siren song of protectionism. In recent years, the trade deficit led some misguided politicians to call for protectionism, warning that otherwise we would lose jobs. But they were wrong again. In fact, the United States not only didn’t lose jobs, we created more jobs than all the countries of Western Europe, Canada, and Japan combined. The record is clear that when America’s total trade has increased, American jobs have also increased. And when our total trade has declined, so have the number of jobs.
 
Part of the difficulty in accepting the good news about trade is in our words. We too often talk about trade while using the vocabulary of war. In war, for one side to win, the other must lose. But commerce is not warfare. Trade is an economic alliance that benefits both countries. There are no losers, only winners. And trade helps strengthen the free world.
 
Yet today protectionism is being used by some American politicians as a cheap form of nationalism, a fig leaf for those unwilling to maintain America’s military strength and who lack the resolve to stand up to real enemies – countries that would use violence against us or our allies. Our peaceful trading partners are not our enemies; they are our allies.
 
We should beware of the demagogs who are ready to declare a trade war against our friends – weakening our economy, our national security, and the entire free world – all while cynically waving the American flag. The expansion of the international economy is not a foreign invasion; it is an American triumph, one we worked hard to achieve, and something central to our vision of a peaceful and prosperous world of freedom.
 
After the Second World War, America led the way to dismantle trade barriers and create a world trading system that set the stage for decades of unparalleled economic growth. And in one week, when important multilateral trade talks are held in Montreal, we will be in the forefront of efforts to improve this system. We want to open more markets for our products, to see to it that all nations play by the rules, and to seek improvement in such areas as dispute resolution and agriculture. We also want to bring the benefits of free trade to new areas, including services, investment, and the protection of intellectual property. Our negotiators will be working hard for all of us.
 
Yes, back in 1776, our Founding Fathers believed that free trade was worth fighting for. And we can celebrate their victory because today trade is at the core of the alliance that secure the peace and guarantee our freedom; it is the source of our prosperity and the path to an even brighter future for America.

The questions below address whether these radio addresses by President Reagan are relevant in today’s context of the imposition of tariffs by President Trump.

Videos of Radio Addresses

Articles and postings

Questions

  1. Summarise Ronald Reagan’s arguments.
  2. How would Donald Trump reply to these arguments?
  3. Can tariffs ever be justified on efficiency grounds?
  4. Can tariffs be justified as a bargaining ploy? Can they be used as a means of achieving freer and fairer trade?
  5. Find out why the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act was introduced in 1930 and what were its consequences.
  6. How does the World Trade Organization seek to promote freer and fairer trade? How does it resolve trade disputes?